PERSONAL INJURY | 2026-11-12

Covenant Not to Execute, Stipulated Judgment, and Assignment of Bad-Faith Claims in California: What Happens When an Insurer Abandons Its Insured

How a policyholder whose insurer wrongfully refuses to defend can settle with the claimant through a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute, and an assignment of the bad-faith claim, and what Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty requires the assignee to prove

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

When a liability insurer wrongfully refuses to defend its policyholder, it leaves the insured exposed to a lawsuit alone. California law gives the abandoned policyholder a powerful escape: rather than go to trial unprotected, the insured can settle with the claimant by agreeing to a stipulated...

The Problem: An Insurer That Refuses to Defend

A liability insurer owes its policyholder a duty to defend that is broader than its duty to indemnify: it must provide a defense whenever the claim is even potentially covered. When an insurer wrongfully refuses that defense, the policyholder is left to face a lawsuit without the protection it paid for. Going to trial alone risks a large personal judgment. California law supplies an alternative that lets the abandoned insured protect itself while preserving a remedy against the insurer that broke its promise. That alternative combines three instruments: a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute, and an assignment of the insured’s claims against the insurer.

The Three-Part Settlement Device

The device works like this. First, the insured and the claimant agree to a stipulated judgment — an agreed judgment entered against the insured for a specified sum, without a contested trial. Second, the claimant grants the insured a covenant not to execute, promising not to enforce that judgment against the insured’s personal assets. Third, the insured assigns to the claimant its rights against the insurer, including any claim for breach of the duty to defend and for insurance bad faith. The claimant, now standing in the insured’s shoes, pursues the insurer for the amount of the stipulated judgment. The insured walks away without paying out of pocket; the claimant looks to the insurer; and the insurer faces the consequences of its refusal to defend.

Why the Assignment Is Permitted

California permits the assignment of an insured’s bad-faith and breach claims against its insurer, with important limits. The California Supreme Court recognized in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 937 that an insured’s cause of action against its insurer for wrongful failure to settle is assignable as to its economic-loss components, but that the insured’s purely personal tort recoveries — such as damages for emotional distress and punitive damages — are generally not assignable. That assignability is what makes the whole device possible: without it, the claimant could not step into the insured’s position to sue the insurer. The assignment transfers the economic dimension of the bad-faith claim, allowing the party actually harmed by the insurer’s conduct — through an uncollectible judgment — to seek redress.

The Pruyn Framework

The leading Court of Appeal decision mapping out how these settlements operate against an insurer is Pruyn v. Agricultural Insurance Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 500. Pruyn held that when an insurer wrongfully abandons its insured, the insured may protect itself through a settlement with the claimant — including a stipulated judgment and a covenant not to execute — and that such a settlement can be enforced against the breaching insurer, provided the settlement was reasonable and free of fraud or collusion. Pruyn established the practical ground rules: the insurer’s breach must come first, the settlement must be a genuine, arm’s-length evaluation of the claim’s exposure, and collusion between the insured and the claimant to manufacture an inflated judgment is fatal.

Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty: The Supreme Court’s Limits

The California Supreme Court refined this area in Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718. In Hamilton, the insurer had defended its insured but refused a settlement demand within policy limits; the insured then agreed to a stipulated judgment with a covenant not to execute and assigned its claims to the claimants. The Court held that a defending insurer is not bound by a settlement made without its participation and without any actual commitment by the insured to pay the judgment. Because the covenant not to execute means the insured never actually has to pay, the stipulated judgment does not establish the insured’s damages — even if the figure is reasonable, and even if a court approved the settlement as made in good faith. Hamilton expressly distinguished cases in which the insurer refused to defend: there, the insured may settle on the best terms possible, and a reasonable settlement made in good faith may be used as presumptive evidence of the insured’s liability and its amount. Hamilton thus left intact the device recognized in Pruyn for abandoned insureds while guarding against stipulated judgments being used against insurers that did provide a defense.

The Reasonableness Test in Practice

Where the insurer refused to defend, the central battleground is usually the reasonableness of the settlement. Courts evaluate whether the stipulated amount reflects a realistic assessment of the insured’s exposure had the case been tried: the strength of the claimant’s liability case, the severity of the damages, the applicable policy limits, and the risks each side faced. A settlement that tracks a genuine evaluation of the claim is defensible; one that bears no relationship to the real exposure, or that was negotiated to punish the insurer rather than to value the claim, invites attack. The insurer may contest reasonableness with evidence that the judgment was inflated or collusive.

Guarding Against Fraud and Collusion

Because the insured has no personal stake once the covenant not to execute is in place, the risk of collusion is inherent: the insured has little incentive to resist a large number it will never pay. California law answers this risk in two ways. First, the reasonableness requirement screens out inflated judgments. Second, a settlement tainted by fraud or collusion does not bind the insurer. A good-faith settlement determination under Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6 does not fill this gap: its statutory effect is to bar contribution and indemnity claims, and Hamilton held that such approval cannot turn an agreed judgment into a determination of the insured’s liability. An insurer defending an assigned claim will scrutinize the negotiations for signs that the insured and claimant cooperated to maximize the insurer’s exposure rather than to value the case honestly.

What the Assignee Must Prove

Putting the pieces together, a claimant-assignee pursuing the insurer must establish several things. The insurer must have breached a duty it owed — most commonly the duty to defend. The settlement, including the stipulated judgment, must have been reasonable in amount and entered in good faith, without fraud or collusion. And the assignment must validly transfer the insured’s rights. Only then can the assignee recover from the insurer, and even then the recovery is not automatically measured by the stipulated figure. This structure protects genuinely abandoned insureds and the claimants who settle with them, while denying a windfall built on a judgment no one ever intended to pay.

Strategic Considerations for Policyholders and Claimants

For a policyholder facing a denied defense, the covenant-not-to-execute settlement is often the safest path: it caps personal exposure at zero while preserving a claim against the insurer. But it must be documented carefully — the breach established, the settlement’s reasonableness supported by a real evaluation of the case, and the assignment properly drafted. For a claimant, taking an assignment means accepting the burden of proving the insurer’s breach and the settlement’s reasonableness; the stipulated number is a starting point, not a guaranteed recovery. Both sides benefit from building a contemporaneous record — correspondence demanding a defense, the insurer’s refusal, and a documented valuation of the claim — because that record is what carries the later action against the insurer.

The Difference Between a Duty-to-Defend Breach and a Duty-to-Indemnify Dispute

The covenant-not-to-execute device is most closely associated with a breach of the duty to defend, and that is no accident. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify: an insurer must defend whenever the complaint reveals even a potential for coverage, resolving doubt in favor of the insured. When an insurer refuses a defense it owes, it commits a present, concrete breach that leaves the insured exposed immediately — and that breach is what justifies the insured in taking its own steps to protect itself through settlement. A pure duty-to-indemnify dispute is different: it turns on whether the final facts place the loss within coverage, a question often not resolved until after the underlying case ends. Because an indemnity dispute may be legitimate and unresolved, an insurer’s refusal to pay an indemnity claim does not carry the same immediate "abandonment" consequences as a wrongful refusal to defend.

This distinction shapes when the device is available and how strong the insured’s position is. An insured whose insurer wrongly refused to defend stands on firm ground in settling with a stipulated judgment and assignment, because the insurer’s breach is clear and the insured was genuinely exposed. An insured whose insurer defended under a reservation of rights, but disputes indemnity, is in a more complex position, because the insurer did not abandon the defense. Identifying which duty was breached, and whether the breach was wrongful, is therefore the threshold analysis before any covenant-not-to-execute settlement is contemplated.

Insurer Defenses to an Assigned Stipulated-Judgment Claim

An insurer sued on an assigned stipulated judgment has a defined set of defenses, and understanding them tells both sides how to structure or attack the settlement. The insurer can contest whether it breached any duty at all — arguing, for instance, that the claim was never even potentially covered, so no defense was owed. It can challenge the reasonableness of the stipulated amount, offering evidence that the judgment far exceeds the realistic trial value of the claim. It can assert fraud or collusion, pointing to indicators that the insured and claimant cooperated to inflate the number the insured would never pay. And if it provided a defense rather than refusing one, it can invoke Hamilton to argue that the stipulated judgment does not establish the insured’s damages at all.

Each defense maps onto an element the assignee must prove, which is why the assignee’s record matters so much. A documented demand for a defense and the insurer’s written refusal answer the breach defense. A settlement amount tied to a genuine, contemporaneous evaluation of liability and damages answers the reasonableness attack. Arm’s-length negotiation, ideally with the involvement of the underlying plaintiff’s counsel pressing for value, answers the collusion charge. The lesson for policyholders and claimants is that the time to defeat the insurer’s defenses is while the settlement is being negotiated and documented — not after the insurer raises them in the assigned action.

Why Policyholders Choose This Path Over Going to Trial

An abandoned policyholder facing a lawsuit alone confronts a stark choice. It can defend the case at its own expense and risk a personal judgment that could consume its assets, or it can use the covenant-not-to-execute settlement to cap its personal exposure at zero while transferring the fight to the insurer that broke its promise. For most policyholders, the second path is far safer. Defending alone means paying defense costs the insurer should have borne, bearing the risk of an adverse verdict, and then still having to sue the insurer afterward to recover. The settlement device collapses that risk: the insured secures a covenant protecting its assets, and the claimant — now the real party in interest — assumes the burden of pursuing the insurer.

This allocation of risk is not a loophole; it reflects a considered policy judgment. An insurer that wrongfully refuses to defend has broken the core promise of the liability policy, and California law does not require the insured to absorb the consequences of that breach. By permitting assignment of the bad-faith claim and enforcement of a reasonable, non-collusive settlement against the insurer, the law places the loss where it belongs. At the same time, the reasonableness requirement and the bar on fraud and collusion protect the insurer from inflated or collusive judgments. The result is a balanced system: genuinely abandoned insureds are protected, claimants have a solvent source of recovery, and insurers answer only for reasonable settlements that reflect the real value of the claims they declined to defend.

For a policyholder weighing the option, the practical message is to act deliberately and with counsel. The decision to settle through a stipulated judgment should follow a clear, documented breach by the insurer and a genuine evaluation of the claim’s value. Done right, the device turns an insurer’s abandonment from a catastrophe into a manageable dispute between the claimant and the insurer — exactly the party that should have been defending all along.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is a covenant not to execute?

It is a promise by the claimant not to enforce a judgment against the insured’s personal assets. Paired with a stipulated judgment and an assignment of the insured’s claims against its insurer, it lets an abandoned policyholder settle without paying out of pocket while preserving a remedy against the insurer.

When can an insured use this device?

Typically when the insurer has wrongfully refused to defend, leaving the insured to face the lawsuit alone. The insurer’s breach is the predicate; the insured then settles with the claimant through a stipulated judgment, covenant not to execute, and assignment.

Is the insured’s bad-faith claim assignable in California?

Largely, yes. Murphy v. Allstate (1976) 17 Cal.3d 937 recognized that an insured’s claim against its insurer for wrongful failure to settle is assignable as to its economic-loss components; the insured’s personal claims for emotional distress and punitive damages are generally not assignable. That assignability is what lets the claimant step into the insured’s shoes.

Does the stipulated judgment amount automatically bind the insurer?

No. Under Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, when the insurer provided a defense, a stipulated judgment obtained with a covenant not to execute does not bind the insurer or establish the insured’s damages. When the insurer refused to defend, a reasonable, good-faith settlement may serve as presumptive evidence of the insured’s liability and its amount, but the insurer may still challenge it as unreasonable, fraudulent, or collusive.

What does "reasonable" mean here?

It means the amount a reasonably prudent person in the insured’s position would have agreed to, considering the likelihood and extent of the insured’s liability, the damages, and the applicable policy limits. The insurer may challenge it by showing the judgment was inflated or collusive.

What is the role of Pruyn v. Agricultural Insurance Co.?

Pruyn (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 500 established that an abandoned insured may settle through a stipulated judgment and covenant not to execute enforceable against the breaching insurer, provided the settlement is reasonable and free of fraud or collusion. Hamilton later refined how much such a judgment binds the insurer.

How does the law prevent collusion?

Through the reasonableness requirement and the rule that a settlement tainted by fraud or collusion does not bind the insurer. Because the insured has no personal stake once protected by the covenant, courts scrutinize whether the settlement honestly valued the claim or was engineered to maximize the insurer’s exposure.

Should I document the insurer’s refusal before settling?

Yes. A contemporaneous record — the demand for a defense, the insurer’s refusal, and a documented valuation of the claim — is what later supports the breach and reasonableness elements in the action against the insurer. Build that record before settling.

Speak With a California Insurance Attorney

If your insurer has refused to defend you, or you are a claimant considering a settlement with an abandoned policyholder, Trembach Law Firm can help structure a covenant-not-to-execute settlement designed to withstand scrutiny and pursue the assigned bad-faith claim against the insurer. For a consultation, call (213) 645-2246. We represent policyholders and claimants in insurance coverage and bad-faith disputes throughout California, and we build the documented record of breach, reasonableness, and good faith that a covenant-not-to-execute settlement needs to withstand the insurer’s defenses.

This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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