CUSTOMS LITIGATION | 2026-10-09

The Major Questions Doctrine and the Fall of the IEEPA Tariffs: How the Supreme Court Decided the President Could Not Impose Them

When the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs in February 2026, it did not rest on trade policy. It rested on a question of power: whether Congress had clearly authorized the President to impose sweeping tariffs under an emergency statute. Understanding that reasoning explains why the tariffs fell and what it means for a California importer’s refund.

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not authorize the President to impose the tariffs that had been collected under it. The decision, issued 6-3 in the consolidated cases of Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Select

Few customs decisions reach the Supreme Court, and fewer still reshape an entire tariff program. The IEEPA tariff litigation did both. To understand the refund landscape importers now face, it helps to understand the legal reasoning that produced it — because the grounds on which the tariffs fell shape how, and whether, money comes back.

What the IEEPA Tariffs Were

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, enacted in 1977, gives the President authority to respond to unusual and extraordinary foreign threats by regulating a range of international economic transactions after declaring a national emergency. The statute speaks of authority to investigate, block, and "regulate … importation," among other powers. Beginning in 2025, that language was used as the asserted basis for broad tariffs — duties on goods from several countries and sweeping "reciprocal" tariffs on imports worldwide. Importers paid those duties at entry, and the lawfulness of the program became the central question in a wave of litigation.

The Question the Court Actually Decided

The legal issue was narrow and structural: does the power to "regulate … importation" include the power to impose tariffs? The Court said no. Writing the principal opinion, Chief Justice Roberts framed the task as deciding only whether that regulatory power embraces the power to tax imports, and concluded that it does not. The majority accepted that taxes can serve regulatory ends, but reasoned that it does not follow that a general power to regulate something includes the distinct power to tax it as a means of regulation. The power to tax imports is a specific and weighty authority that Congress has historically granted in express terms in dedicated tariff statutes — not something to be read into a general grant to "regulate."

The Major Questions Doctrine

The structural heart of the decision was the major questions doctrine. Under that doctrine, when the executive claims a power of vast economic and political significance, courts will not find that power in a statute unless Congress has clearly authorized it. The principal opinion reasoned that a claimed authority to impose unbounded tariffs on imports from around the world is precisely such a question — one of major economic and political significance — and therefore requires clear congressional authorization that IEEPA does not contain. The Chief Justice observed that when Congress has intended to confer tariff power, it has done so expressly, as in the specific tariff statutes that spell out the President’s authority and its limits. The absence of any comparable clear grant in IEEPA was decisive.

It is worth being precise: the portion of the analysis invoking the major questions doctrine as a clear-statement rule was joined by the Chief Justice together with Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, and did not command a full majority of the Court on every point. Other Justices reached the same result by a more conventional reading of the statute. But the major questions framing is the doctrine most associated with the decision and the one that best explains its structural logic.

The Concurrences: Different Routes to the Same Result

The Justices did not all travel the same path. Justice Gorsuch, concurring in the judgment, emphasized that the Constitution lodges the lawmaking power in Congress and that the major questions doctrine safeguards that assignment against executive encroachment, requiring the President to identify clear statutory authority for an extraordinary claimed power. Justice Barrett, concurring, described the doctrine more modestly — as a way of reading a statute’s text in its full context, an ordinary application of textualism rather than a special clear-statement rule. And Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, concurred in the judgment on the ground that ordinary statutory construction alone showed IEEPA did not authorize the tariffs, without needing to decide whether a clear-statement rule applied; Justice Jackson added that IEEPA’s legislative history reinforced that reading.

The practical point for importers is that a clear majority agreed on the bottom line — IEEPA does not authorize these tariffs — even though the Justices differed on the precise interpretive method. The result is what governs.

The Dissents

Two Justices dissented. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the major questions doctrine should not apply because, in his view, IEEPA did clearly authorize the tariffs and because the doctrine should not operate in the foreign-affairs arena where the President’s authority is at its height. Justice Thomas argued, among other things, that the nondelegation doctrine did not bar Congress from delegating authority over foreign trade in the manner claimed. The dissents are not law, but they frame the contested questions — the reach of the major questions doctrine and the scope of executive power in foreign affairs — that will continue to be debated.

The Precedent in the Background: The Nixon Surcharge and Yoshida

IEEPA did not arrive on a blank slate. Its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act, contained nearly identical "regulate … importation" language, and in 1971 President Nixon invoked that language to impose a temporary 10% surcharge on dutiable imports during a balance-of-payments crisis. That surcharge was challenged, and in United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals upheld it — but on narrow terms. The court stressed that the surcharge was temporary, was capped at the rates Congress had already set in the tariff schedules, and was a limited response to a declared emergency, not an unbounded power to set tariffs at will. The Government leaned on Yoshida to defend the IEEPA tariffs. The problem, as the challengers framed it, was that the 2025 tariffs bore little resemblance to the modest, rate-capped, temporary surcharge Yoshida blessed. They were open-ended, worldwide, and untethered to any ceiling Congress had enacted. Yoshida, in other words, proved the opposite of what the Government needed: it showed that even a sympathetic court had treated emergency "regulation" of imports as a constrained authority, not a blank check to tax. The distance between Yoshida's careful limits and the sweeping 2025 program underscored why the claimed power looked like a major question demanding clear congressional authorization.

How the Major Questions Doctrine Developed

The doctrine the Court applied did not spring up for this case. It crystallized over a line of recent decisions in which the Court declined to find vast executive power in general statutory language. In West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), the Court held that the Clean Air Act did not clearly authorize the EPA to restructure the nation's electricity-generation sector, naming the major questions doctrine expressly. In National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109 (2022), the Court stayed a vaccine-or-test mandate covering most of the national workforce, reasoning that so consequential a measure required clear congressional authorization. And in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023), the Court held that the HEROES Act did not authorize the mass cancellation of student-loan debt. Each decision rested on the same intuition: the bigger the claimed power — economically and politically — the clearer Congress's authorization must be. The IEEPA tariff case extended that logic into the trade arena. A program reshaping global import costs and raising hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue sat comfortably within the category of questions the Court had said demand a clear statement. Understanding this lineage helps importers see that the decision was not an improvised result but the application of a maturing body of separation-of-powers law.

The Tariff Statutes Congress Actually Wrote

Part of why IEEPA failed is that Congress has written detailed, express tariff statutes when it meant to give the President tariff power — and IEEPA is not among them. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862, authorizes tariffs to protect national security, but only after a Commerce Department investigation and within a defined procedure. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251, authorizes safeguard tariffs after an International Trade Commission injury finding. Section 301 of the same Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411, authorizes retaliatory measures after a U.S. Trade Representative investigation into unfair foreign practices. Each of these statutes spells out findings, procedures, and limits — the hallmarks of a considered congressional grant of tariff authority. IEEPA, by contrast, speaks only of "regulat[ing] … importation" in response to an emergency and says nothing about duties, rates, or tariff schedules. The contrast was central to the Court's reasoning: when Congress wants the President to set tariffs, it says so in detail, as it did in these statutes. The silence of IEEPA on the subject was not an oversight to be filled by the executive; it was evidence that the power had never been granted. For importers, the practical lesson is that lawful tariff programs still exist under these other statutes — the decision did not disturb them — but the specific IEEPA tariffs that generated the refund claims did not share that pedigree.

The Jurisdictional Ruling

The decision also resolved a jurisdictional question with practical consequences. The Court treated the challenges as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. On that basis, the judgment in V.O.S. Selections — which had come through the Court of International Trade — was affirmed, while Learning Resources, which had originated in a federal district court, was vacated for lack of jurisdiction. The ruling reinforces that disputes over the tariff and customs laws belong in the specialized customs court, a theme that runs through the refund procedures importers must now navigate and that we discuss in our article on residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).

What the Court Did Not Decide: Refunds

Crucially for importers, the Court did not resolve how refunds would work. It held the tariffs unlawful but did not address the remedy — how, when, or through what process importers would recover the billions of dollars in duties that had been collected. The dissents themselves flagged the magnitude of the potential refunds. That silence is why the refund process has unfolded through subsequent proceedings and agency action rather than flowing automatically from the decision itself. Refunds are not automatic: importers generally must act to claim them, and deadlines apply.

This gap between the merits ruling and the remedy is the single most important practical takeaway. A company that assumes the Supreme Court’s decision put money back in its account is mistaken. The decision established the unlawfulness; recovering the duties requires following the customs refund machinery.

Why the Reasoning Matters for Your Refund

The ground on which the tariffs fell shapes the refund analysis in concrete ways. Because the tariffs were held to exceed the President’s statutory authority — not merely to be procedurally flawed — the duties collected under them were, in substance, collected without lawful basis. That strengthens the case for recovery on the merits. But the merits are only half the picture. The refund still runs through the customs system’s procedural rules: the finality of liquidation, the protest deadlines, the payment prerequisites, and the jurisdictional clocks. We examine those mechanics in our articles on the finality of liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and the "pay first" rule of 28 U.S.C. § 2637. The Supreme Court won the war on authority; each importer must still win the procedural battle on its own entries.

What California Importers Should Do Now

For a California importer that paid IEEPA duties, the decision is an opportunity that must be acted upon, not awaited. The practical steps are to identify every entry on which IEEPA duties were paid, determine the liquidation status and protest deadline for each, pursue refunds through the administrative process where available, and preserve litigation rights where the administrative route does not deliver. Because the Court left the remedy to the ordinary customs machinery, the deadlines that govern that machinery — not the date of the decision — control whether a given entry’s refund is preserved or lost. The importers who recover fully will be the ones who treated the ruling as a starting gun.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the Supreme Court actually hold about the IEEPA tariffs?

On February 20, 2026, in the consolidated cases Learning Resources v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, the Court held 6-3 that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. It concluded that the power to "regulate … importation" does not include the power to tax imports.

What is the major questions doctrine?

It is a principle that courts will not read a statute to grant the executive a power of vast economic and political significance unless Congress has clearly authorized it. The principal opinion applied it to conclude that IEEPA’s general language did not clearly authorize sweeping tariffs, though that portion of the reasoning did not command the full Court.

Did all the Justices agree on the reasoning?

They agreed on the result but not the method. Some Justices applied the major questions doctrine as a clear-statement rule; others reached the same conclusion through ordinary statutory interpretation. Two Justices dissented. A clear majority agreed that IEEPA did not authorize the tariffs.

Does the decision mean I automatically get my duties back?

No. The Court held the tariffs unlawful but did not decide the remedy or how refunds would work. Refunds are not automatic; importers generally must claim them through the customs process, and deadlines apply.

Why did the Court send the cases to the Court of International Trade?

The Court treated the challenges as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. It affirmed V.O.S. Selections, which came through that court, and vacated Learning Resources, which had originated in a district court, for lack of jurisdiction.

If the tariffs were unlawful, why is recovering duties still difficult?

Because the refund runs through the customs system’s procedural rules — finality of liquidation, protest deadlines, payment prerequisites, and jurisdictional time limits. The unlawfulness strengthens the merits, but each importer must still satisfy those procedures for its own entries.

What should I do with entries that already liquidated?

Review each one promptly. Whether a refund is still available can depend on whether the entry became final and whether a timely protest was filed. Because deadlines run entry by entry, delay can forfeit otherwise-recoverable refunds.

How can a California importer protect its refund rights?

Catalog every entry with IEEPA duties, determine each entry’s liquidation status and deadlines, pursue administrative refunds, and preserve litigation options where needed. Trembach Law Firm can perform that analysis and manage the process. Call (213) 645-2246.

Talk to a California Customs Lawyer About Your IEEPA Refund

The Supreme Court’s February 2026 decision settled the central question — the IEEPA tariffs were not authorized by the statute invoked to impose them. But the Court left the remedy to the ordinary customs machinery, which means recovering your duties depends on acting within the deadlines that govern protests, liquidation finality, and refund suits. Trembach Law Firm, led by Anatolii Trembach (LL.M. in international trade; admitted in California), helps importers turn the ruling into recovered dollars by managing the refund process from entry audit through litigation. Call (213) 645-2246 to protect your IEEPA refund claims.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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