WORKPLACE HARASSMENT | 2026-11-11

Me-Too Evidence in California Harassment Cases: The Pantoja Rule Under FEHA (2026)

Testimony that the same harasser targeted other employees can be admissible to prove intent, motive, and a hostile work environment.

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

One of the hardest things about a harassment case is that the worst conduct usually happens with no witnesses. California evidence law offers a powerful answer: testimony that the same harasser did the same things to other employees. In Pantoja v. Anton, the Court of Appeal confirmed that this so-ca

Why harassment cases turn on patterns

Workplace harassment rarely comes with convenient documentation. A harasser tends to act when no one is watching, behind a closed office door or in a one-on-one setting, and the target is often left with their own word against the harasser flat denial. That evidentiary imbalance is exactly why patterns matter so much. If the same supervisor harassed several employees in similar ways, that pattern tells a jury something no single incident ever could: that the conduct was intentional rather than accidental, that it followed a recognizable method, and that it created an environment hostile to members of a protected group. California law allows that pattern evidence, within limits, and Pantoja is the leading decision explaining both the power and the boundaries of it.

The value of pattern evidence is not only that it corroborates the plaintiff account. It also changes the character of the case. A single disputed incident is a credibility contest. A documented pattern of similar conduct against multiple victims is a picture of how a person operates, and juries understand patterns intuitively. That is why defendants fight so hard to keep me-too evidence out, and why the rules governing its admission are worth understanding in detail.

What Pantoja v. Anton held

In Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, the Court of Appeal held that me-too evidence, meaning testimony that the same alleged harasser engaged in similar harassing conduct toward other employees, can be admissible in a FEHA harassment or discrimination case to show the defendant intent, motive, or the existence of a hostile environment. The court recognized that such evidence is relevant even when the plaintiff did not personally witness the conduct directed at the other employees, because it bears on whether the defendant acted with the required intent and on the overall character of the workplace. The court made clear that the categorical exclusion of this kind of evidence can be an abuse of discretion where the evidence is genuinely probative of a disputed issue.

At the same time, Pantoja did not create an automatic rule of admission. Admissibility remains subject to the trial court discretion under Evidence Code § 352 to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or undue consumption of time. The decision thus rejects a blanket bar on me-too evidence while preserving case-by-case judicial control over how much of it comes in and in what form.

How California compares to the federal approach

Pantoja is often read alongside the United States Supreme Court decision in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn (2008), which addressed testimony by other employees of discrimination in a federal age case. Mendelsohn held that the admissibility of such other-employee evidence is fact-specific and not governed by a categorical rule of inclusion or exclusion; it depends on the particular facts, the theory of the case, and the ordinary balancing of probative value against prejudice. California, through Pantoja, likewise rejects any blanket rule and leaves admissibility to contextual balancing. The two decisions reflect a shared principle: other-employee evidence is neither always admissible nor always barred, and the trial court must assess its relevance and its risks in the specific case before it.

The FEHA harassment prohibition

Harassment is prohibited by Government Code § 12940(j), which makes it unlawful for an employer, and in defined circumstances an individual harasser personally, to harass an employee, an applicant, an unpaid intern, or a person providing services under a contract because of a protected characteristic. To be actionable as a hostile environment, the harassment generally must be severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create a working environment that a reasonable person in the plaintiff position would find abusive. Me-too evidence bears directly on both the pervasiveness and the severity questions, because a harasser treatment of others helps establish the nature and the extent of the environment the plaintiff actually endured, and it rebuts the suggestion that the plaintiff experience was an isolated misunderstanding.

How Government Code 12923 reshaped the standard

The Legislature strengthened harassment protections through Government Code § 12923, which sets out legislative findings about the correct application of the severe-or-pervasive standard and corrects several judicial interpretations the Legislature viewed as too stingy. Among other things, § 12923 affirms that a single incident of harassing conduct can be sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the conduct unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. It rejects the notion that the plaintiff must show a decline in productivity, and it declares that harassment cases are rarely appropriate for resolution on summary judgment. These findings make it considerably harder for employers to dispose of harassment claims early, and they increase the practical value of pattern evidence that keeps a case alive and in front of a jury.

What me-too evidence is used to prove

Me-too testimony serves several distinct and legitimate purposes. It can prove intent and motive, showing that the conduct toward the plaintiff was not a misunderstanding or an isolated lapse but part of a deliberate and repeated pattern. It can establish the hostile character of the environment itself, because a workplace in which a manager repeatedly harasses members of a protected group is, by its nature, objectively hostile. It can corroborate the plaintiff account against a credibility attack, by showing that other people independently experienced the same treatment from the same person. And it can bear on employer notice and liability, because repeated conduct and repeated complaints suggest that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and nonetheless failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct it.

The Evidence Code 352 balancing limit

Me-too evidence is powerful, which is precisely why it is not automatically admitted in full. Under Evidence Code § 352, the trial court weighs the probative value of the proffered testimony against the risk of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, of misleading the jury, and of consuming undue time in a series of mini-trials about collateral incidents. The closer the other-employee conduct is to the plaintiff own experience, in the kind of conduct, in the identity of the harasser, and in time, the stronger its probative value and the more likely it is admitted. Remote incidents, dissimilar conduct, different harassers, or accounts that are mainly inflammatory are more vulnerable to exclusion or limitation. The analysis is contextual and discretionary, which is exactly the approach both Pantoja and Mendelsohn endorse.

Distinguishing admissible patterns from character evidence

Me-too evidence must be offered for a permissible purpose, not merely to paint the harasser as a bad person. Under general evidence principles, evidence of a person other acts is inadmissible when offered only to prove a propensity to behave a certain way, but it is admissible when offered to prove intent, motive, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake, and in the FEHA context to establish the hostile environment itself. Framing therefore matters a great deal. Counsel introduces the testimony to show the defendant intent and the character of the workplace, the very purposes Pantoja approved, rather than as proof of general bad character, which keeps the evidence on the admissible side of the line and strengthens its chances of surviving an Evidence Code § 352 objection.

Building a me-too record

A strong harassment case identifies other employees who experienced similar conduct from the same person and documents the similarities carefully: the nature of the comments or physical acts, the protected characteristic targeted, the timeframe, the setting, and the harasser pattern of behavior. Declarations, internal complaints, human-resources investigation files, prior settlements where discoverable, and deposition testimony from those other employees build the record. The tighter the match to the plaintiff own experience, the better the evidence survives Evidence Code § 352 scrutiny. Early investigation matters because witnesses move on, memories fade, and employers often resist producing complaint histories unless a plaintiff presses through discovery and, when necessary, a motion to compel.

The quality of the match is what separates compelling me-too evidence from a sideshow. Testimony that the same supervisor directed the same kind of comments at employees sharing the plaintiff protected characteristic, during an overlapping period, in the same workplace, is close to the heart of the case and tends to survive an Evidence Code § 352 objection. Testimony about a different manager, a different kind of conduct, or events years removed is weaker and invites exclusion or a limiting instruction. A plaintiff building the record should therefore prioritize witnesses whose experience most closely tracks their own, and should develop the specifics of each incident, because a handful of tightly matched accounts is worth far more than a long list of loosely related grievances.

It is also worth remembering why the Legislature made these cases hard to dispose of early. Government Code § 12923 reflects a deliberate policy judgment that harassment claims turn on context, credibility, and the cumulative weight of conduct, all of which are classic jury questions. Me-too evidence is the mechanism that supplies that context, and the statutory direction that these cases are rarely suited to summary judgment works hand in hand with Pantoja to keep a well-supported pattern in front of the factfinder.

Employer liability and prevention

Me-too patterns also go directly to the employer own exposure. When multiple employees complain about the same harasser, the employer knowledge and its response, or its failure to respond, become central to liability. An employer that ignored repeated complaints, conducted sham investigations, or left a known harasser in a supervisory role may be liable for failing to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent and correct harassment, which is a separate and independent duty under the FEHA framework. For employers, the lesson is to investigate every complaint seriously and promptly, because a buried or minimized complaint can resurface later as me-too evidence in another employee lawsuit and can transform a single disputed incident into proof of a tolerated and ongoing pattern that is far harder to defend.

The employer prevention duty and the avoidable-consequences defense

Me-too evidence does not operate in a vacuum; it interacts directly with the employer defenses. Under the FEHA framework, an employer has an affirmative duty to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent and promptly correct harassment, a duty set out in Government Code § 12940(k). An employer that received earlier complaints about the same harasser and did nothing has breached that duty, and the earlier complaints become both me-too evidence of the pattern and direct proof of the employer failure to act. On the other side, employers sometimes raise the avoidable-consequences defense, arguing that a plaintiff unreasonably failed to use the employer complaint procedure and thereby could have avoided some of the harm. That defense can reduce damages but does not eliminate liability where harassment occurred, and it is undercut when me-too evidence shows that complaints by others were ignored, because a worker cannot be faulted for failing to report to a system that demonstrably did not work. A documented pattern of unaddressed complaints therefore does double duty: it proves the hostile environment and it defeats the employer attempt to shift responsibility to the victim. For employers, the only reliable protection is a complaint process that actually functions, prompt and genuine investigations, and real consequences for harassers, because a paper policy that is never enforced provides no defense and becomes evidence of the very pattern it was supposed to prevent.

Discovery of other complaints and how to obtain it

Me-too evidence is only useful if a plaintiff can actually find it, and much of it lives in the employer own files. Prior complaints against the same harasser, human-resources investigation reports, disciplinary records, and even past settlements can be discoverable, though employers routinely resist producing them on grounds of privacy, relevance, and burden. California recognizes a constitutional right of privacy that other employees hold in their personnel information, so courts often balance that privacy against the plaintiff need for the evidence and may order production subject to a protective order, redaction, or notice to the affected individuals. The closer the prior complaints are to the plaintiff own experience in conduct, harasser, and time, the stronger the showing of relevance and the more likely a court compels production. A plaintiff who frames discovery requests precisely, targeting complaints about the same harasser and the same kind of conduct, is far more likely to pry loose the pattern evidence than one who asks for everything. When an employer stonewalls, a motion to compel supported by the Pantoja relevance rationale and the § 12923 recognition that harassment cases are rarely suited to early disposition is the path forward.

Remedies and the individual liability of harassers

The stakes of a harassment case are high for both the employer and the individual harasser. A prevailing plaintiff may recover economic damages, noneconomic damages for emotional distress, and, where malice, oppression, or fraud is shown, punitive damages under the standard of Civil Code § 3294. FEHA authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff under Government Code § 12965, which makes these cases viable to pursue. Crucially, harassment differs from discrimination in one important respect: under Government Code § 12940(j), an individual harasser can be held personally liable for the harassment, not just the employer. That personal exposure means a supervisor who harasses employees cannot hide behind the corporate entity, and it gives me-too evidence added significance, because a documented pattern of harassing multiple employees strengthens the case against both the employer, for failing to prevent and correct, and the harasser, for the conduct itself.

Deadlines for harassment claims under FEHA

Harassment claims follow the same administrative-exhaustion structure as other FEHA claims, and the deadlines are firm. An employee generally must file a complaint with the Civil Rights Department under Government Code § 12960 within three years of the last act of harassment, and because harassment is often continuing, the timing of the most recent incident can extend the reachable period under a continuing-violation theory. After the agency issues a right-to-sue notice, the employee generally has one year to file a civil action under Government Code § 12965. A plaintiff should calendar these dates at the outset, because even a case rich with me-too evidence can be lost on a missed administrative deadline. The continuing nature of harassment makes it especially important to document each incident and its date, since the last act in a pattern can control the timeliness of the entire claim.

A worked example

Consider an employee who reports that a supervisor repeatedly made demeaning sexual comments to her over several months, always when they were alone. The supervisor denies everything, and without witnesses the case looks like a credibility standoff. Now add me-too evidence: two former employees testify that the same supervisor made strikingly similar comments to them during overlapping periods, and a human-resources file produced in discovery shows an earlier complaint the employer investigated and buried. Under Pantoja, that testimony and those records are admissible to show the supervisor intent and the hostile character of the environment, subject to Evidence Code § 352 balancing, and because the other-employee conduct closely matches the plaintiff experience in kind, harasser, and time, it is likely to come in. The pattern transforms a one-on-one credibility dispute into a documented practice, supports both severe-or-pervasive hostility under § 12940(j) as clarified by § 12923 and the employer failure to prevent and correct, and makes early dismissal of the claim very unlikely.

Pattern and comparator evidence spans harassment and discrimination alike, and the treatment of biased comments in discrimination cases is a close cousin, covered in our guide to the stray-remarks doctrine after Reid v. Google. You can follow current developments on our California employment law news page.

Talk to a California employment lawyer. If you were harassed and suspect you were not the only one, the attorneys at Trembach Law Firm can investigate the pattern, gather me-too testimony, and present it under Pantoja and the FEHA framework to show the full scope of what happened. Call (213) 645-2246 for a confidential consultation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can testimony about harassment of other employees be used in my case?

Yes, it can. Under Pantoja v. Anton (2011), me-too evidence that the same harasser engaged in similar conduct toward other employees is admissible in a FEHA case to show intent, motive, or a hostile environment, subject to balancing under Evidence Code § 352.

Do I have to have personally seen the harassment of others?

No. Pantoja recognized that me-too evidence can be relevant even if you did not personally witness the conduct against other employees, because it bears on the harasser intent and on the character of the workplace you experienced.

What makes harassment actionable under California law?

Government Code § 12940(j) prohibits harassment because of a protected characteristic. The conduct generally must be severe or pervasive, but Government Code § 12923 confirms that a single serious incident can suffice and that harassment cases are rarely suited to summary judgment.

When will a court exclude me-too evidence?

Under Evidence Code § 352, a court may exclude the testimony if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or undue consumption of time. Evidence that closely matches your experience in conduct, harasser, and time is more likely to be admitted.

How does me-too evidence affect the employer liability?

Repeated conduct and repeated complaints go to whether the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or correct it, which is a separate basis for employer liability under the FEHA framework.

This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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