PERSONAL INJURY | 2026-11-03
No "Comparative Bad Faith" in California: Why an Insurer Cannot Blame the Insured to Escape Its Own Bad Faith
Insurers once argued that a policyholder’s own conduct should reduce a bad-faith recovery, the way comparative negligence reduces a tort award. In Kransco, the California Supreme Court rejected that defense.
By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published
When a policyholder sues an insurer for bad faith, insurers have sometimes tried to turn the tables — arguing that the insured’s own conduct during the claim should reduce the insurer’s liability, the way a plaintiff’s comparative negligence reduces a tort award. This defense, called comparative bad
Insurance bad-faith law in California rests on a simple premise: an insurer owes its policyholder a duty of good faith and fair dealing, and when it breaches that duty — by unreasonably denying a claim, lowballing a payment, or failing to settle within policy limits — it is liable in tort for the resulting harm. Faced with bad-faith claims, insurers developed a counterargument: that the insured’s own conduct during the claim should be weighed against the insurer, reducing or eliminating its liability under a comparative-fault theory borrowed from ordinary negligence law. California courts flirted with this comparative bad faith doctrine for a time, but the California Supreme Court ultimately rejected it in Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390. Understanding why matters to every policyholder pressing a bad-faith claim.
The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Every insurance policy in California carries an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant obligates the insurer to give at least as much consideration to the insured’s interests as it gives to its own, and not to unreasonably withhold the benefits of the policy. Because insurance serves a protective, quasi-public function and the parties stand in a special relationship, California permits an insured to recover in tort — not merely contract — when the insurer breaches this covenant, opening the door to damages beyond the policy benefits, including emotional distress and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages.
The duty runs in two settings. In the first-party context, where the insured makes a claim under its own policy, the insurer acts in bad faith when it unreasonably denies or delays benefits owed. The California Supreme Court recognized first-party bad faith in cases such as Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566. In the third-party context, where the insurer defends and indemnifies the insured against a claim, bad faith classically arises when the insurer unreasonably fails to settle within policy limits and exposes the insured to an excess judgment — the rule of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 654. In both settings, the insurer’s obligation is measured by the reasonableness of its own conduct.
What "Comparative Bad Faith" Claimed
The comparative bad-faith defense tried to import comparative fault into this framework. In ordinary negligence law, a plaintiff’s own carelessness reduces recovery in proportion to fault. Insurers argued that the same logic should apply to bad-faith claims: if the insured was also careless or uncooperative during the claim — slow to provide information, imperfect in its presentation, or partly responsible for the dispute — the insured’s conduct should be compared against the insurer’s and the recovery reduced accordingly. Some called it comparative bad faith; others, reverse bad faith, suggesting the insured itself could breach a duty of good faith owed back to the insurer.
The theory had surface appeal and gained some early footing in California intermediate authority. If both sides contributed to a claims breakdown, why should the insurer bear the entire loss? But the argument rested on a questionable equivalence between the insurer’s duty of good faith — a special, elevated obligation flowing from the insurance relationship — and the insured’s ordinary conduct during a claim. That equivalence is what the Supreme Court ultimately rejected.
Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines
In Kransco, the California Supreme Court squarely addressed whether an insured’s conduct could be asserted as a comparative-fault defense to reduce an insurer’s liability for bad faith. The Court held that it could not. An insured’s mere negligence or other conduct short of the kind of misconduct that would itself excuse the insurer’s performance is not a defense that proportionally reduces the insurer’s bad-faith liability. The insurer’s obligation is defined by the reasonableness of its own investigation and handling of the claim, and that obligation is not diminished because the insured was also imperfect.
The Court’s reasoning turned on the nature of the duties. The insurer’s duty of good faith is a special one, arising from the insurance relationship and the insurer’s superior position; it is not symmetrical with the insured’s ordinary obligations. Allowing the insured’s negligence to offset the insurer’s bad faith would dilute the insurer’s duty and undermine the protective purpose of bad-faith law. Kransco thus disapproved the line of authority that had entertained comparative bad faith, confirming that an insurer cannot escape or reduce liability simply by pointing to the insured’s own carelessness.
What Insured Conduct Still Matters
Kransco did not make the insured’s conduct irrelevant — it drew a careful line. Conduct that goes to whether the insurer acted reasonably remains highly relevant. If the insured’s own actions made the insurer’s conduct reasonable — for example, by creating a genuine dispute about coverage or by withholding information the insurer needed — then the insurer may not have acted in bad faith at all, because bad faith requires unreasonable conduct by the insurer. The question is framed around the insurer’s reasonableness, and the insured’s conduct bears on that question.
Likewise, conduct by the insured that breaches the policy’s own conditions — failing to cooperate as the policy requires, failing to submit to an examination under oath, or making a material misrepresentation — can defeat coverage or excuse the insurer’s performance under established doctrines, independent of any comparative-fault theory. What Kransco forbids is the distinct move of treating the insured’s ordinary negligence as a percentage offset against an insurer that did act unreasonably. The insured’s conduct can show the insurer was reasonable, or can breach a policy condition; it cannot simply discount a proven bad-faith recovery.
The Genuine Dispute Rule as the Proper Channel
The legitimate concern behind comparative bad faith — that an insurer should not be liable when the claim was genuinely contestable — is addressed in California through the genuine dispute doctrine rather than comparative fault. Under that doctrine, an insurer does not act in bad faith when it denies or delays a claim based on a genuine, reasonable dispute about coverage or the amount owed, even if the insurer ultimately turns out to be wrong. The focus, again, is on the reasonableness of the insurer’s position, not on apportioning fault between the parties.
This is the correct channel for the insurer’s legitimate arguments. If the insured’s conduct, or the ambiguity of the claim, created a reasonable basis for the insurer’s position, the genuine dispute doctrine protects the insurer — not because the insured was comparatively at fault, but because the insurer did not act unreasonably. By routing the inquiry through reasonableness rather than comparative fault, California keeps the focus where bad-faith law places it: on whether the insurer honored its heightened duty to the policyholder.
Unfair Claims Practices and the Statutory Backdrop
California’s bad-faith law operates against a statutory backdrop. The Unfair Insurance Practices Act, Insurance Code § 790.03(h), enumerates claims-handling practices that are unfair — among them failing to acknowledge and act promptly on communications, failing to adopt reasonable standards for prompt investigation, and not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt and equitable settlement of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. While the statute does not itself create a private right of action for a third party, its standards inform what reasonable claims handling looks like and reinforce the insurer’s obligations.
These standards all measure the insurer’s conduct. None of them invites a comparative-fault offset for the insured’s imperfections. Read together with Kransco, the statutory and common-law framework points in one direction: the insurer is judged by whether its own investigation, communication, and settlement conduct met the standard of good faith. An insurer that fell short cannot rehabilitate its position by cataloguing the insured’s minor missteps.
What This Means for Policyholders
For a California policyholder pursuing a bad-faith claim, Kransco is a shield against a common defense tactic. When an insurer responds to a bad-faith claim by blaming the insured’s own conduct, the policyholder can point to Kransco: the insured’s mere negligence is not a comparative-fault defense that reduces the recovery. The inquiry returns to where it belongs — whether the insurer acted reasonably. The insurer may still argue that its position was reasonable or that the insured breached a policy condition, but it cannot simply discount a proven bad-faith award by assigning the insured a share of fault.
Policyholders should nonetheless act carefully during a claim, because conduct that makes the insurer’s position reasonable, or that breaches a policy condition, can defeat the claim through the proper doctrines. Cooperating fully, providing requested information, and documenting the insurer’s handling all strengthen a later bad-faith case. But the policyholder confronting the comparative bad-faith argument should know that California law forecloses it: an insurer that acted unreasonably answers for that conduct, undiluted by the insured’s ordinary imperfections.
How This Plays Out at Trial
The practical effect of Kransco is felt in how a bad-faith case is framed for the jury. Without comparative bad faith, the insurer cannot ask the jury to assign the insured a percentage of fault and reduce the award accordingly. There is no verdict form line apportioning blame between policyholder and insurer. The central question put to the jury is whether the insurer’s handling of the claim was unreasonable — its investigation, its communications, its evaluation, and its settlement conduct. The insured’s conduct enters only insofar as it bears on that question.
This framing matters enormously to the shape of the trial. An insurer that hoped to spend the trial cataloguing the insured’s every misstep finds that evidence admissible only where it genuinely bears on the reasonableness of the insurer’s conduct — for instance, to show that the insured withheld information the insurer reasonably needed, making the insurer’s delay reasonable. The insurer cannot simply parade the insured’s imperfections to invite a fault discount. Keeping the jury focused on the insurer’s reasonableness, and resisting attempts to smuggle in a comparative-fault theme, is a core task of the policyholder’s trial strategy, and Kransco supplies the legal basis for doing so.
Punitive Damages and the Insurer’s Exposure
Because bad faith sounds in tort, a policyholder who proves the insurer acted with oppression, fraud, or malice may recover punitive damages under Civil Code § 3294, over and above the contract benefits and other compensatory damages. This is a significant part of what makes bad-faith liability serious for insurers, and it is another reason the rejection of comparative bad faith matters. An insurer facing potential punitive exposure cannot dilute it by assigning the insured a share of comparative fault; the inquiry remains whether the insurer’s own conduct was not merely unreasonable but reached the level of oppression, fraud, or malice.
The availability of punitive damages reinforces the structure Kransco protects. Bad-faith law exists to hold insurers to a heightened standard because of their special relationship with, and power over, policyholders. Allowing an insurer to offset that liability — compensatory or punitive — by pointing to the insured’s ordinary carelessness would undercut the deterrent and protective purpose of the doctrine. By keeping the focus squarely on the insurer’s conduct, California law preserves both the policyholder’s remedy and the pressure on insurers to handle claims in good faith. For a policyholder, this means a well-proven bad-faith case retains its full value, undiminished by the kind of fault-shifting that comparative bad faith would have allowed.
It is worth emphasizing how far this places California from the law of ordinary negligence. In a negligence case, a plaintiff who is thirty percent at fault recovers seventy percent of the damages; fault is apportioned and the award is reduced to match. Bad-faith law deliberately refuses that symmetry. The reason is the asymmetry of the relationship itself: the insurer drafted the policy, holds the money, controls the claims process, and occupies a position of trust and power over a policyholder who bought the coverage for protection. The duty of good faith is the law’s response to that imbalance, and a comparative-fault offset would quietly erode it. Kransco recognized that an insurer judged to have handled a claim unreasonably should answer for that conduct in full, and that the policyholder’s ordinary human imperfections during a stressful claim are not a currency the insurer can use to buy down the consequences of its own bad faith.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is comparative bad faith?
Comparative bad faith, sometimes called reverse bad faith, was an argument that an insured’s own conduct during a claim should reduce an insurer’s bad-faith liability the way comparative negligence reduces a tort award. California rejected this defense in Kransco.
What did Kransco decide?
Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390 held that an insured’s mere negligence or imperfect conduct is not a comparative-fault defense that reduces an insurer’s bad-faith liability. The insurer’s obligation is measured by the reasonableness of its own conduct.
Why did California reject comparative bad faith?
Because the insurer’s duty of good faith is a special, elevated obligation arising from the insurance relationship, not symmetrical with the insured’s ordinary conduct. Allowing the insured’s negligence to offset the insurer’s bad faith would dilute that duty and undermine the protective purpose of bad-faith law.
Does the insured’s conduct still matter at all?
Yes. Conduct that bears on whether the insurer acted reasonably remains relevant — if the insured created a genuine dispute or withheld needed information, the insurer may not have acted in bad faith. And conduct breaching a policy condition can defeat coverage. What is forbidden is a percentage offset for ordinary negligence.
What is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
It is an obligation implied in every California insurance policy requiring the insurer to give at least as much consideration to the insured’s interests as to its own. Breaching it allows the insured to recover in tort, including damages beyond policy benefits.
How does the genuine dispute doctrine relate?
The genuine dispute doctrine addresses the insurer’s legitimate concern directly: an insurer does not act in bad faith when it denies or delays a claim based on a genuine, reasonable dispute, even if it is ultimately wrong. The focus is the insurer’s reasonableness, not apportioning fault between the parties.
What is Insurance Code § 790.03(h)?
It is part of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act, listing unfair claims-handling practices such as failing to investigate promptly and failing to attempt prompt, equitable settlement where liability is reasonably clear. These standards measure the insurer’s conduct and reinforce its obligations.
How should a policyholder respond if the insurer blames them?
Point to Kransco: the insured’s mere negligence is not a comparative-fault defense. The inquiry returns to whether the insurer acted reasonably. Still, cooperate fully and document the insurer’s handling, because conduct breaching a policy condition can defeat a claim through other doctrines.
Related Guides
Speak With a California Insurance Bad-Faith Attorney
If your insurer denied or shortchanged your claim and is now blaming you, California law may be on your side. Trembach Law Firm represents policyholders in bad-faith disputes and defeats attempts to shift blame onto the insured. Call (213) 645-2246 for a consultation. Anatolii Trembach holds an LL.M. and is admitted to the California Bar.
This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Bad-faith claims are fact-specific; consult a qualified attorney about your particular policy and claim.
Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.
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