CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | 2026-10-08
Exclusive-Forum Bylaws Under DGCL § 115: Why a California Shareholder’s Fiduciary Claim May Have to Be Litigated in Delaware
A California investor who wants to sue a Delaware company’s board for breach of fiduciary duty may find the corporation’s own bylaws require the case to be filed in Delaware. Exclusive-forum bylaws, validated in Boilermakers v. Chevron and later codified in DGCL § 115, are now standard — and they change where, and sometimes whether, a claim gets litigated.
By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published
When a California investor believes a Delaware corporation’s directors breached their fiduciary duties — in a merger, a self-dealing transaction, or a failure of oversight — the instinct is to sue where the investor lives. But the corporation’s bylaws may say otherwise. Over the past decade, exclusi
Where a corporate dispute is litigated can matter as much as its merits. Delaware’s Court of Chancery is the most experienced business court in the country, with a deep body of precedent and judges who decide fiduciary cases without juries. Exclusive-forum bylaws channel internal corporate claims into that court, and understanding how they operate is essential for any California investor or company connected to a Delaware entity.
What an Exclusive-Forum Bylaw Does
An exclusive-forum bylaw is a provision in a corporation’s bylaws (or certificate of incorporation) designating a single jurisdiction — almost always Delaware — as the mandatory forum for certain categories of litigation against the company and its directors and officers. The covered categories typically include derivative actions brought on the corporation’s behalf, claims of breach of fiduciary duty, claims arising under the Delaware General Corporation Law, and claims governed by the internal-affairs doctrine. A shareholder who files such a claim in a California court will likely face a motion to dismiss or transfer based on the bylaw, and courts around the country have generally enforced these provisions.
The effect is not to extinguish the claim but to relocate it. The shareholder can still sue — but in Delaware, under Delaware procedure, before the Court of Chancery. For many claimants that is a meaningful practical burden, and for the corporation it concentrates governance litigation in a predictable, expert forum.
Boilermakers v. Chevron: The Decision That Validated the Practice
The foundational case is Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 2013. The boards of Chevron and FedEx had adopted bylaws designating Delaware as the exclusive forum for internal corporate claims, and shareholders challenged the boards’ power to do so unilaterally. The court, in an opinion by then-Chancellor Strine, upheld the bylaws. It reasoned that under DGCL § 109(b), bylaws may address the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and the rights or powers of its stockholders, and that a forum provision for internal-affairs litigation fits comfortably within that authority.
The court also rejected the argument that board-adopted bylaws cannot bind stockholders contractually. It explained that the certificate of incorporation, the bylaws, and the DGCL together form a flexible contract to which investors assent when they buy stock, knowing the board has power to adopt and amend bylaws. The decision drew a line between claims relating to the internal affairs of the corporation — which a forum bylaw may reach — and wholly external matters, which it may not.
Codification in Section 115
After Boilermakers was decided and its approach affirmed, the Delaware legislature codified the practice in DGCL § 115. The statute confirms that the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require that "internal corporate claims" be brought solely and exclusively in the courts of Delaware, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements. Critically, § 115 provides that such a provision may not prohibit bringing those claims in at least one court in Delaware — a company cannot use a forum provision to deny a Delaware forum altogether — and it defines "internal corporate claims" to capture claims based on a breach of duty by current or former directors, officers, or stockholders in that capacity, and claims as to which the DGCL confers jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery.
Section 115 thus gives statutory footing to what Boilermakers permitted and sets its outer limits. It legitimizes exclusive-Delaware-forum provisions while preventing them from pushing internal claims entirely outside Delaware.
What Claims Are Covered — and What Are Not
The reach of a forum bylaw tracks the concept of "internal corporate claims." Covered claims generally include:
- Derivative actions asserting claims that belong to the corporation;
- Claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors or officers;
- Claims arising under the DGCL; and
- Claims otherwise governed by the internal-affairs doctrine.
Not covered are claims that are external to the corporate relationship — ordinary commercial disputes, tort claims by third parties, and the like. A particularly important boundary concerns federal securities claims. Section 115 addresses internal corporate claims governed by state corporate law; it does not purport to channel federal securities-law claims, which raise distinct questions addressed by a different device — the federal-forum provision we discuss in our article on federal-forum provisions and the 1933 Act after Salzberg and Cyan. A company may use both: a § 115 exclusive-Delaware-forum bylaw for state-law internal claims and a federal-forum provision for 1933 Act claims.
Why Boards Adopt These Bylaws
The business rationale is concrete. Before exclusive-forum bylaws, a single corporate transaction could spawn parallel suits in multiple states, forcing the company to litigate the same fiduciary questions simultaneously in different courts, with the risk of inconsistent rulings and duplicative cost. Concentrating internal claims in Delaware addresses that multi-forum problem: one case, one court, one body of law, decided by judges who handle such disputes constantly. For the corporation and its stockholders collectively, that efficiency and predictability are the principal justifications the Boilermakers court recognized.
The flip side, from a plaintiff-shareholder’s perspective, is reduced leverage. The ability to choose a forum — and to threaten multi-front litigation — was a source of settlement pressure that forum bylaws remove. That shift is precisely why these provisions are now standard.
Enforceability and Its Limits
Although courts broadly enforce exclusive-forum bylaws, enforcement is not automatic in every circumstance. A provision adopted or applied inequitably, used to manipulate litigation in bad faith, or asserted against claims outside the "internal corporate claims" definition may be resisted. Courts applying another state’s law occasionally weigh forum-selection enforceability against public policy. And a bylaw cannot, under § 115, bar a Delaware forum entirely. For a California shareholder, the question is therefore not only "is there a forum bylaw?" but "does it validly cover this claim, and is it being applied properly?" Those are fact- and claim-specific questions that merit analysis before a suit is filed in the wrong court and dismissed.
What This Means for California Shareholders
For a California investor contemplating a fiduciary or derivative claim against a Delaware corporation, the forum bylaw should be one of the first documents reviewed. It will usually dictate that the claim be filed in Delaware, which affects counsel selection, cost, procedure, and timing. It does not mean the claim lacks merit or cannot be pursued — only that it must be pursued in the designated forum. Early analysis avoids the wasted effort and potential prejudice of filing in California only to be sent to Delaware, and it allows the investor to build the case under the law and procedure that will actually govern it.
What This Means for California Companies Incorporated in Delaware
For a California company incorporated in Delaware, a well-drafted § 115 exclusive-forum bylaw is a standard and prudent governance measure. Paired with a federal-forum provision for 1933 Act claims, it channels both state and federal securities exposure into predictable forums and reduces the risk of duplicative multi-state litigation. The bylaw should be drafted to track the statutory definition of internal corporate claims, preserve a Delaware forum as § 115 requires, and be adopted through a proper board process. Companies should revisit their forum provisions periodically as the case law continues to develop.
The Multi-Forum Problem These Bylaws Solved
To understand why exclusive-forum bylaws became universal, it helps to picture the problem they addressed. Before they existed, a single significant corporate event — a merger announcement, a restatement, a controversial transaction — could trigger near-identical shareholder suits filed simultaneously in several states: in Delaware (the state of incorporation), in the state of the company’s headquarters, and sometimes elsewhere. The corporation and its directors then had to defend the same fiduciary allegations on multiple fronts, with the risk that different courts would reach inconsistent conclusions about the same conduct, and with plaintiffs’ counsel competing to control the litigation. The duplication was expensive for the company and, ultimately, for its stockholders, who bear those costs.
Exclusive-forum bylaws collapse that sprawl into a single proceeding in one expert court. The Boilermakers court identified this efficiency as a legitimate corporate purpose, and it is the practical reason boards adopt the provisions and courts enforce them. For stockholders as a group, consolidated litigation in Delaware can mean lower cost and more coherent results; for an individual plaintiff, it means litigating where the company chose rather than where the plaintiff might prefer.
Charter Provision Versus Bylaw
Section 115 permits a forum provision to appear in either the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws, and the difference matters. A provision in the certificate of incorporation is adopted and amended only with a stockholder vote, giving it democratic legitimacy and making it harder to change. A bylaw, by contrast, can often be adopted or amended by the board alone, which is what made Boilermakers’ holding — that board-adopted bylaws bind stockholders — so significant. Many companies place the forum provision in their bylaws for flexibility, while some use the charter for durability. For a shareholder evaluating a claim, the location of the provision affects how and when it could be changed, but under § 115 a validly adopted provision in either document is enforceable.
The choice also bears on challenges. A charter-based provision carries the weight of a stockholder vote, while a board-adopted bylaw is more exposed to arguments that it was adopted inequitably in particular circumstances. Either way, the provision’s substance must stay within the statutory definition of internal corporate claims.
Forum Bylaws and the Internal-Affairs Doctrine
Exclusive-forum bylaws are closely tied to the internal-affairs doctrine, the conflict-of-laws principle that the law of the state of incorporation governs a corporation’s internal affairs — the relationships among the corporation, its directors, officers, and shareholders. That doctrine already means a California court adjudicating a claim about a Delaware corporation’s internal governance would apply Delaware substantive law. A forum bylaw goes a step further, directing that the claim be heard in a Delaware court as well. The two work in tandem: the internal-affairs doctrine fixes which law applies, and the forum provision fixes where the case is heard. For a California shareholder, the combined effect is that a governance claim against a Delaware company is typically both governed by Delaware law and litigated in Delaware.
Derivative Suits, Demand, and the Forum
Forum bylaws have particular force in derivative litigation — suits a shareholder brings on the corporation’s behalf. Derivative claims are quintessential internal corporate claims, squarely within § 115, so a forum bylaw will ordinarily require them to be filed in Delaware. There, Delaware’s demand requirements and its distinctive procedures for testing whether a board was capable of impartially considering a demand will apply. A California shareholder contemplating a derivative claim must therefore plan not only for a Delaware forum but for Delaware’s substantive and procedural framework governing demand, special litigation committees, and the standards for excusing demand. These are consequential differences that shape whether and how a derivative claim can proceed, and they should inform strategy from the outset.
What Enforcement Looks Like in Practice
When a shareholder files an internal corporate claim outside the designated forum, the corporation typically responds with a motion to dismiss or to stay the action based on the forum provision. Courts evaluating that motion ask whether the provision is valid, whether the claim falls within its scope, and whether enforcing it would be unreasonable or contrary to public policy in the circumstances. If the provision is valid and covers the claim, the usual result is dismissal or a stay so the claim can be refiled in Delaware. California courts, like courts in most states, generally honor these provisions for internal corporate claims, consistent with the strong policy favoring enforcement of forum-selection clauses and with the internal-affairs doctrine that already points to Delaware law. The upshot for a shareholder is that filing in the wrong forum rarely defeats the bylaw; it usually just delays the case and adds cost. Recognizing the provision at the outset and litigating in the designated forum from the start is almost always the better course, and it lets the shareholder build the case under the law and procedure that will actually govern it rather than losing time to a venue fight the bylaw is designed to win.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a Delaware company really force me to sue in Delaware?
For internal corporate claims — derivative suits, breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, and claims under the DGCL — yes, if the company has a valid exclusive-forum bylaw. DGCL § 115 authorizes such provisions, and courts generally enforce them by dismissing or transferring claims filed elsewhere.
What is DGCL § 115?
Section 115 of the Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes a corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws to require that internal corporate claims be brought exclusively in Delaware courts. It also provides that such a provision cannot bar a Delaware forum entirely, and it defines the internal corporate claims that may be covered.
What did Boilermakers v. Chevron decide?
In 2013, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld board-adopted exclusive-forum bylaws under DGCL § 109(b), holding that forum provisions for internal-affairs litigation are a valid exercise of bylaw authority and that stockholders are contractually bound by them. The decision was affirmed and later codified in § 115.
What claims do exclusive-forum bylaws cover?
Typically derivative actions, breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, claims arising under the DGCL, and claims governed by the internal-affairs doctrine. They do not cover wholly external matters like ordinary commercial or third-party tort claims.
Do these bylaws cover federal securities claims?
No. Section 115 addresses state-law internal corporate claims. Federal securities claims, such as 1933 Act claims, are handled by a separate device — a federal-forum provision — which Delaware law also permits. A company may use both types of provision.
Can an exclusive-forum bylaw ever be challenged?
Yes, in appropriate cases. A provision applied inequitably or in bad faith, or asserted against claims outside the internal-corporate-claims definition, may be resisted, and a bylaw cannot bar a Delaware forum entirely. Enforceability depends on the specific claim and circumstances.
Does a forum bylaw mean my claim is worthless?
No. It only dictates where the claim must be litigated. A meritorious fiduciary or derivative claim can still be pursued — in the designated Delaware forum, under Delaware procedure. The bylaw affects venue, not the underlying merits.
What should I do before suing a Delaware company’s board?
Review the corporation’s certificate and bylaws for a forum provision, determine whether it validly covers your claim, and plan to litigate in the designated forum. Trembach Law Firm can analyze the provision and the claim before anything is filed. Call (818) 514-7680.
Speak With a California Corporate Lawyer About Forum Bylaws
Exclusive-forum bylaws under DGCL § 115 quietly decide where a governance dispute will be fought, often years before it begins. For a California shareholder, filing in the wrong court wastes time and can prejudice the claim; for a California company incorporated in Delaware, a well-drafted forum provision is a standard protection against duplicative litigation. Trembach Law Firm, led by Anatolii Trembach (LL.M.; admitted in California), analyzes forum provisions, advises on enforceability, and plans governance and fiduciary litigation around the forum that will actually govern it. Call (818) 514-7680 to discuss your situation.
Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.
Trembach Law Firm | 27001 Agoura Road, Suite 350, Calabasas, CA 91301