CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | 2026-10-10

Books-and-Records Demands After Delaware’s 2025 Reforms: How California Stockholders Use DGCL § 220 to Investigate Corporate Wrongdoing

Before suing a board, Delaware stockholders are expected to investigate — and Section 220 is the tool. But Delaware’s 2025 amendments narrowed what a stockholder can demand and tightened the requirements. California investors need to understand both the enduring power of a § 220 demand and its new limits.

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

Delaware courts repeatedly tell stockholders who suspect mismanagement or wrongdoing to investigate before they sue — to use the "tools at hand" rather than filing a derivative complaint built on speculation. The most important of those tools is the books-and-records inspection demand under Section

A stockholder who suspects that a company's directors have mismanaged the business, engaged in self-dealing, or ignored red flags faces a practical problem: the facts that would prove it are inside the company, not in the stockholder's hands. Delaware law addresses that problem through the books-and-records inspection right. Rather than letting stockholders file sprawling lawsuits and then demand discovery, Delaware expects them to investigate first, through a targeted records demand, and to plead a complaint grounded in what those records reveal. For California investors in Delaware corporations — which is to say most public companies and venture-backed startups — the § 220 demand is the gateway to accountability.

Why Delaware Law Reaches California Investors

Under the internal affairs doctrine, which California courts follow, the law of the state of incorporation governs the relationship between a corporation and its stockholders. A California resident who owns stock in a Delaware corporation headquartered anywhere exercises inspection rights under Delaware's § 220, not under California's own inspection statutes. That is why Delaware's 2025 reforms matter directly to California investors, and why a California stockholder contemplating an investigation needs to understand Delaware's framework — the proper-purpose requirement, the credible-basis standard, and the new statutory limits — rather than assuming California procedures apply.

The Core Right: Inspection for a Proper Purpose

Section 220 gives a stockholder the right to inspect, upon written demand, the corporation's books and records, provided the inspection is for a proper purpose — one reasonably related to the person's interest as a stockholder. The classic proper purposes include investigating suspected mismanagement or wrongdoing, valuing shares, and communicating with other stockholders about corporate affairs. The demand must comply with statutory form requirements, including being made under oath and stating the purpose. If the corporation refuses, the stockholder may sue in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel inspection, and § 220 provides for expedited handling. The right is powerful precisely because it does not require the stockholder to have already proven wrongdoing; it is an investigative tool to find out whether wrongdoing occurred.

The Credible-Basis Standard for Investigating Wrongdoing

Where the stated purpose is to investigate suspected mismanagement or wrongdoing, Delaware courts have long required the stockholder to show a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing — the lowest burden of proof recognized under Delaware law. The stockholder need not prove that wrongdoing actually occurred; it is enough to present some evidence suggesting a credible basis from which the court can infer that wrongdoing may have occurred. The Delaware Supreme Court articulated this standard in cases such as Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc. (Del. 2006) 909 A.2d 117, which confirmed that mere suspicion or disagreement with business decisions is not enough, but that a credible basis — often drawn from public filings, news reports, regulatory actions, or restatements — will support inspection. The credible-basis threshold strikes a balance: it screens out fishing expeditions while allowing genuine investigations to proceed. For a stockholder, assembling that credible basis from public sources before serving the demand is a critical first step.

Delaware's 2025 Reforms to Section 220

In March 2025, Delaware enacted amendments to § 220 (through Senate Bill 21, as substituted) that significantly reshaped the inspection right. The amendments apply to demands made, or actions commenced, after February 17, 2025. Several changes stand out:

Defined proper purposes and particularity. The amended statute requires that a demand be made in good faith, describe with reasonable particularity the stockholder's purpose and the records sought, and that the records be specifically related to that purpose. This tightens the older, more flexible practice in which broad demands could be refined through litigation.

Enumerated categories of records. The amendments list specific categories of "books and records" a stockholder may obtain — such as the certificate of incorporation and bylaws, board and committee minutes and materials, communications to stockholders, annual financial statements, and director and officer independence questionnaires. Commentators have noted that this enumerated list may exclude informal materials like emails and text messages that had become central to some derivative investigations, unless a court finds specific circumstances warranting broader production.

Confidentiality and redaction. The amendments expressly permit corporations to impose reasonable confidentiality restrictions on inspected records and to redact information not specifically related to the stockholder's purpose.

The practical effect is a more structured, somewhat narrower inspection right. Supporters describe the changes as codifying existing case law and curbing overbroad demands; critics argue they constrain stockholder oversight and the Court of Chancery's flexibility. Either way, a post-2025 demand must be drafted with the enumerated categories and particularity requirements squarely in mind.

Why the Records Matter: Building a Caremark or Fiduciary Claim

The documents a § 220 demand produces are frequently the raw material for a later lawsuit. Board minutes and committee materials can reveal whether directors actually considered a conflicted transaction, whether they monitored legal and operational risk, and whether they responded to red flags. This is especially important for oversight (Caremark) claims, where the question is whether the board utterly failed to implement a reporting system or consciously ignored warning signs — a theory we examine in our article on Caremark oversight duties after Marchand. Delaware courts have repeatedly emphasized that stockholders should use § 220 to obtain board-level documents before filing a Caremark complaint, because the complaint must plead particularized facts showing the board's failure. The inspection right thus feeds directly into the pleading standard for the underlying claim: without the records, a derivative complaint is likely to be dismissed; with them, it may survive.

Section 220 in the M&A Context

Books-and-records demands also play a central role around mergers and acquisitions. A stockholder investigating whether a board breached its duties in a sale — whether it ran a flawed process, favored a controller, or accepted an inadequate price — can use § 220 to obtain the board materials that reveal how the deal was negotiated. Those records bear on claims under the frameworks we discuss in our articles on entire fairness in controlling-stockholder mergers, Revlon duties in a sale of control, and Corwin cleansing by stockholder vote. Because a fully informed, uncoerced stockholder vote can "cleanse" a transaction and raise the standard of review, the question of what stockholders were told — and whether the proxy disclosures were complete — is often litigated using § 220 records. Here too, the inspection right is the investigative engine that makes a later challenge viable.

Practical Steps for a California Stockholder

A stockholder considering a § 220 demand should proceed deliberately. First, establish standing — confirm stock ownership and gather proof, because the statute requires it. Second, assemble a credible basis from public sources: SEC filings, financial restatements, regulatory enforcement actions, news coverage, and litigation elsewhere. Third, draft the demand to satisfy the post-2025 requirements — stated under oath, describing the purpose and the specific enumerated records with reasonable particularity, and tying each category to the purpose. Fourth, be prepared for the corporation to negotiate scope, impose confidentiality, and redact; these are now expressly contemplated by the statute. Fifth, if the corporation refuses, be ready to litigate promptly in the Court of Chancery. Throughout, the goal is not to win a sideshow over records but to obtain the documents that will support — or appropriately dispel — a claim about the underlying conduct. A disciplined, well-grounded demand is far more likely to succeed than an overbroad one that invites a motion to narrow or dismiss.

Section 220 and the Demand-Futility Problem

The books-and-records right is tightly bound to the procedural rules governing derivative litigation — lawsuits a stockholder brings on the corporation's behalf against its directors. Before filing such a suit, a stockholder must either make a demand on the board to pursue the claim itself or plead with particularity why demand would be futile because the directors cannot impartially consider it. Delaware's test for demand futility, refined in United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg (Del. 2021) 262 A.3d 1034, asks, director by director, whether each could exercise independent and disinterested judgment about the claim. Pleading futility with the required particularity is difficult without inside documents — which is exactly what § 220 supplies. Board minutes showing which directors approved a conflicted transaction, or materials revealing a director's ties to an interested party, can establish that a majority of the board was conflicted. This is why Delaware courts so often say stockholders should use § 220 first: a derivative complaint that pleads futility from public information alone frequently fails, while one grounded in inspection records can clear the demand-futility bar and survive a motion to dismiss. The inspection right and the pleading standard are two halves of the same system.

Standing, Form, and Timing Requirements

A § 220 demand must satisfy technical requirements that are easy to overlook and fatal to miss. The person making the demand must be a stockholder of record or a beneficial owner, and must establish that status with documentary evidence — for beneficial holders, that typically means brokerage statements and related proof of ownership. The demand must be in writing, made under oath, and directed to the corporation's registered office or principal place of business. After the 2025 amendments, it must also describe the purpose and the specific records sought with reasonable particularity and tie the records to the purpose. Timing matters as well: because inspection is often a prelude to litigation, the demand should be made with the applicable statute of limitations for the underlying claim in mind, leaving enough runway to complete the inspection (and any enforcement action) and still file suit in time. A stockholder who serves a defective demand may have to start over, losing weeks or months that a limitations clock does not forgive. Getting the form and timing right the first time is therefore not a technicality but a strategic necessity, and it is a common reason to involve counsel before the demand goes out rather than after the company pushes back.

Limits and Risks of a Demand

Section 220 is not a substitute for full discovery, and it was never meant to be. Courts confine inspection to records "necessary and essential" to the stated purpose, and the 2025 amendments reinforce that confinement. A stockholder who overreaches may obtain less than hoped and may telegraph a litigation theory to the company before filing. There is also a strategic tension: pursuing a § 220 demand takes time, and in fast-moving situations — a pending merger vote, an imminent limitations deadline — a stockholder must weigh the value of a pre-suit investigation against the cost of delay. Experienced counsel helps calibrate these trade-offs, deciding what to demand, when to demand it, and how the resulting records fit the claim the stockholder ultimately intends to bring. Used well, § 220 remains one of the most effective accountability tools available to stockholders of Delaware corporations, even after the 2025 reforms narrowed its edges.

It is also worth remembering what a § 220 demand is not. It is not a merits adjudication: winning inspection does not mean winning the underlying claim, and losing a narrow fight over a particular category of records does not doom the investigation. It is not public discovery either — the records are typically subject to confidentiality restrictions, so a stockholder generally cannot broadcast what it learns. And it is not a substitute for careful legal judgment about whether a viable claim exists at all. A stockholder who treats the demand as the first disciplined step in a larger strategy — build a credible basis, obtain the right board-level records, test them against the elements of a fiduciary or oversight claim, and only then decide whether to sue — uses the tool as Delaware intends. One who treats it as a fishing expedition or a pressure tactic is more likely to draw a motion to narrow, a protective order, or an early dismissal of whatever suit follows.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a Section 220 books-and-records demand?

It is a Delaware stockholder's statutory right to inspect specified corporate records for a proper purpose reasonably related to the person's interest as a stockholder. It is commonly used to investigate suspected mismanagement or wrongdoing before filing a derivative lawsuit.

Does Delaware law apply if I live in California?

Yes, if the company is incorporated in Delaware. Under the internal affairs doctrine, which California follows, inspection rights are governed by the state of incorporation. A California investor in a Delaware corporation uses Delaware's § 220, not California's inspection statutes.

What is the credible-basis standard?

Where the purpose is to investigate wrongdoing, the stockholder must show a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing — the lowest burden under Delaware law, confirmed in cases like Seinfeld v. Verizon. The stockholder need not prove wrongdoing, only present some evidence from which the court can infer it may have occurred.

What did Delaware's 2025 reforms change?

The 2025 amendments (through SB 21, effective for demands made after February 17, 2025) require demands to be made in good faith and describe the purpose and records with reasonable particularity, enumerate specific categories of obtainable records, and expressly allow confidentiality restrictions and redaction. The changes make the right more structured and somewhat narrower.

What records can I now obtain?

The amended statute lists categories such as the charter and bylaws, board and committee minutes and materials, stockholder communications, annual financial statements, and director and officer independence questionnaires. Informal materials like emails may be excluded absent specific circumstances a court finds warrant broader production.

Why do the records matter for a lawsuit?

Board minutes and materials can show whether directors considered a conflicted deal, monitored risk, or ignored red flags — facts a derivative or oversight (Caremark) complaint must plead with particularity. Courts expect stockholders to use § 220 before suing, so the records often make or break the later claim.

Can the company refuse my demand?

It can, and then the stockholder may sue in the Court of Chancery to compel inspection, which the statute allows on an expedited basis. The company may also negotiate scope, impose confidentiality, and redact unrelated information, as the amended statute expressly permits.

Should I send a demand before suing a board?

Usually yes. Delaware courts expect stockholders to investigate with the "tools at hand" first, and a complaint built on § 220 records is far more likely to survive dismissal. Counsel can assess your credible basis, draft a compliant demand, and advise on timing. Call Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680.

Talk to a California Corporate Lawyer About a Books-and-Records Demand

If you suspect that the board of a Delaware corporation you invest in has mismanaged the company or breached its duties, a Section 220 books-and-records demand is often the first and most important step. Delaware's 2025 reforms changed how these demands must be framed, but the right remains a powerful accountability tool. Trembach Law Firm, led by Anatolii Trembach (LL.M.; admitted in California), helps California stockholders build a credible basis, draft compliant demands, litigate inspection rights, and use the records to pursue fiduciary-duty and oversight claims. Call (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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