SECURITIES | 2026-11-04
The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: How United States v. O’Hagan Reaches Outsiders Who Trade on Stolen Information
Insider trading is not limited to corporate insiders. Under the misappropriation theory the Supreme Court endorsed in O’Hagan, anyone who trades on confidential information in breach of a duty to the source of that information can be liable — even a complete outsider to the company whose stock is traded.
By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published
For years, insider-trading law seemed to require a relationship between the trader and the company whose stock was traded: a corporate insider, or someone who received a tip from one, owed a duty to the company’s shareholders. But that "classical" theory left a gap — what about a lawyer, banker, or
Insider-trading law in the United States is built on a counterintuitive foundation: there is no statute that says "do not trade on material nonpublic information." Instead, liability is grafted onto the general antifraud provision — Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 — through the concept of a breached duty. Because the prohibition turns on duty rather than on possession of information, the hardest questions have always been about who owes a duty to whom. The misappropriation theory endorsed in United States v. O’Hagan answered one of the most important of those questions, and in doing so it transformed insider-trading enforcement.
The Classical Theory of Insider Trading
The original, or "classical," theory of insider trading rests on the duty a corporate insider owes to the shareholders of his own company. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court held that trading on material nonpublic information is not fraud merely because the trader has an informational advantage; liability requires a breach of a duty to disclose, which arises from a relationship of trust and confidence between the trader and those with whom he trades. A corporate officer, director, or employee who buys or sells his company’s stock on inside information breaches a duty to the company’s shareholders — the "disclose or abstain" rule.
The classical theory also reaches tippees and temporary insiders. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Court held that a tippee inherits the insider’s duty when the insider breaches a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information for personal benefit and the tippee knows or should know of that breach. Lawyers, accountants, and consultants who receive confidential information to perform services for the company become temporary insiders who owe the same duty. But the classical theory, by its own logic, requires a duty to the shareholders of the company whose stock is traded. That requirement left outsiders untouched.
The Gap the Classical Theory Left
Chiarella itself illustrated the gap. Vincent Chiarella was a printer who, while typesetting takeover documents, deduced the identities of target companies and traded in their stock before the bids were announced. He owed no duty to the shareholders of those target companies — he was a stranger to them — so the Court reversed his conviction under the classical theory. The information he used was confidential to the acquiring companies and their printer, not to the targets whose stock he bought. The classical theory simply did not reach him.
That left a troubling asymmetry. A corporate insider who traded on a pending deal was liable; an outside professional — a lawyer for the acquirer, an investment banker, a printer — who traded on the very same information was not, because the duty ran the wrong direction. The misappropriation theory was developed to address exactly this situation, and O’Hagan was the case in which the Supreme Court finally endorsed it.
United States v. O’Hagan
James O’Hagan was a partner at a Minneapolis law firm that had been retained by Grand Metropolitan PLC in connection with a potential tender offer for the Pillsbury Company. O’Hagan did no work on the matter, but he learned of the planned bid and bought Pillsbury call options and stock. When the tender offer was announced, Pillsbury’s stock price rose sharply and O’Hagan made a profit of more than $4.3 million. He owed no duty to Pillsbury’s shareholders — under the classical theory he would have escaped, just as Chiarella did. The government charged him under the misappropriation theory.
In O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), the Supreme Court upheld the theory. It held that a person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. The theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information — here, O’Hagan’s deception of his law firm and its client. The misappropriation theory thus "outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate outsider in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information."
Why Misappropriation Is "Deception" and "In Connection With"
The Court’s reasoning answered two statutory objections. First, Section 10(b) requires deception, and O’Hagan argued there was none because he did not deceive the people he traded with. The Court explained that the deception runs to the source: a fiduciary who pretends loyalty while secretly converting confidential information to personal trading use defrauds the principal who entrusted him with the information. Had O’Hagan disclosed his plan to trade to his firm and its client, there would have been no deception — and, the Court noted, perhaps no § 10(b) violation, though other law might forbid the conduct.
Second, the fraud must be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. The Court held that the misappropriation is consummated, and the connection established, when the fiduciary uses the information to trade — the securities transaction and the breach of duty coincide. The theory therefore fit within the statutory language. The Court also sustained the SEC’s authority to adopt Rule 14e-3(a) under Section 14(e), which prohibits trading on material nonpublic information about a tender offer by anyone who knows the information came from the bidder or target, without requiring proof of a breached fiduciary duty at all in that specific tender-offer context.
Who Can Be Liable Under the Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory dramatically widened the field of potential defendants. It reaches anyone who owes a duty of trust or confidence to a source of confidential information and then trades on that information. That includes outside lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, consultants, financial printers, and other service providers — none of whom owe a duty to the issuer whose stock they trade, but all of whom owe duties to their clients or employers. It also reaches employees of trading firms, members of a deal team on the acquirer’s side, and others with access to confidential plans.
The SEC later codified the kinds of relationships that create the requisite duty. Rule 10b5-2 specifies that a duty of trust or confidence exists, for misappropriation purposes, when a person agrees to maintain information in confidence, when two people have a history or pattern of sharing confidences such that the recipient should know confidentiality is expected, or in certain family relationships (spouse, parent, child, sibling). The rule removed uncertainty about whether personal, as opposed to employment, relationships could support a misappropriation case, extending the theory’s reach into family and social contexts. For related governance and disclosure issues, see our securities and corporate governance practice.
The Two Theories Today
After O’Hagan, the classical and misappropriation theories operate as complementary prongs of insider-trading law. The classical theory covers insiders, temporary insiders, and their tippees, premising liability on a duty to the shareholders of the company whose stock is traded. The misappropriation theory covers outsiders, premising liability on a duty to the source of the information. Together they capture the full range of conduct that Congress, through the general antifraud provision, is understood to forbid: trading on confidential information in breach of some recognized duty, whether owed to the trading counterparty’s company or to the information’s source.
Importantly, both theories still require a breach of duty. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to adopt a "parity of information" rule that would make mere possession of material nonpublic information unlawful. A person who lawfully comes upon information — overhearing a conversation in public, or deducing a development from public facts — and owes no duty to anyone commits no fraud by trading. The line between lawful trading on an informational advantage and unlawful insider trading continues to run through the existence and breach of a duty.
Compliance Implications for California Professionals and Companies
For California law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, and other professional-service providers, the misappropriation theory means that confidential client information is also regulated securities information. A professional who trades on a client’s confidential deal — or who tips a friend or family member who trades — risks civil and criminal liability even though the professional has no connection to the issuer. Firms accordingly maintain information barriers, restricted lists, pre-clearance requirements, and personal-trading policies designed to prevent misappropriation and to document compliance.
Companies that share confidential information with outside advisers should likewise ensure that engagement letters and confidentiality agreements make the duty explicit, which strengthens both the firm’s compliance posture and any later enforcement case against a faithless adviser. Individuals who receive confidential information in a relationship of trust — including the family and personal relationships covered by Rule 10b5-2 — should understand that trading on it can expose them to liability. Because the government and the SEC pursue misappropriation cases vigorously, and because the theory’s reach is broad, careful handling of confidential market-moving information is a core element of securities compliance.
Tender Offers and Rule 14e-3
O’Hagan did more than endorse the misappropriation theory; it also upheld a distinct, broader prohibition that applies specifically to tender offers. Rule 14e-3(a), adopted by the SEC under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, makes it unlawful for any person who possesses material nonpublic information about a tender offer to trade in the target’s securities if that person knows the information was acquired from the bidder, the target, or a person acting on their behalf — without requiring proof of a breached fiduciary duty at all. In the tender-offer setting, Congress authorized the SEC to define and prevent fraudulent practices, and the Supreme Court held that Rule 14e-3’s duty-free "disclose or abstain" rule is a reasonable exercise of that authority.
The practical significance is that in tender-offer cases the government need not prove the trader owed and breached a duty to a source — a key element under the misappropriation theory. Because takeover activity is where outsiders most often come into possession of market-moving information, Rule 14e-3 closes a gap that proof-of-duty requirements might otherwise leave open. For anyone working on or near a takeover — bankers, lawyers, printers, and their tippees — Rule 14e-3 is often the more dangerous provision, because it dispenses with the duty analysis that might otherwise provide a defense.
Remedies, Penalties, and Enforcement
Insider trading under either theory carries severe consequences. The SEC may bring a civil enforcement action seeking disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest, injunctions, officer-and-director bars, and civil penalties. Under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act and related provisions, civil penalties can reach three times the profit gained or loss avoided — the "treble" penalty. Controlling persons who fail to maintain adequate policies can face penalties as well under Section 21A of the Exchange Act. Private plaintiffs who traded contemporaneously may also sue under Section 20A.
Criminal liability is also available. Willful violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are prosecuted by the Department of Justice and can result in substantial prison terms and fines — O’Hagan himself was convicted on numerous criminal counts. Because the stakes are this high and because the misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3 reach a wide field of professionals and their relations, firms invest heavily in compliance infrastructure: written policies, restricted and watch lists, pre-clearance of personal trades, surveillance of employee accounts, and training. The breadth of liability is the reason compliance cannot be treated as a formality — a single faithless employee can expose both the individual and, through control-person liability, the firm.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is the misappropriation theory of insider trading?
It is the doctrine that a person violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by trading on confidential information in breach of a duty owed to the source of that information, even if the person owes no duty to the shareholders of the company whose stock is traded. The Supreme Court endorsed it in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
How does it differ from the classical theory?
The classical theory requires a duty to the shareholders of the company whose stock is traded — it covers insiders, temporary insiders, and their tippees. The misappropriation theory requires a duty to the source of the information — it covers outsiders such as lawyers, bankers, and printers who trade on confidential information entrusted to them.
Why was O’Hagan liable when Chiarella was not?
Chiarella was prosecuted only under the classical theory, which failed because he owed no duty to the target companies’ shareholders. O’Hagan was prosecuted under the misappropriation theory, which succeeded because he breached a duty to the source of the information — his law firm and its client — by secretly trading on it.
Where is the "deception" in a misappropriation case?
The deception runs to the source of the information. A fiduciary who feigns loyalty while secretly converting confidential information to personal trading use defrauds the principal who entrusted it to him. The Supreme Court noted that full disclosure to the source could negate the deception element.
What is Rule 10b5-2?
Rule 10b5-2 identifies relationships that create the duty of trust or confidence needed for misappropriation liability: an agreement to keep information confidential, a history or pattern of sharing confidences, or certain family relationships (spouse, parent, child, sibling). It confirmed that personal and family relationships, not just employment, can support a case.
Does merely possessing inside information make trading illegal?
No. Both theories require a breach of a recognized duty. The Supreme Court has declined to adopt a rule that mere possession of material nonpublic information bars trading. A person who owes no duty to anyone and lawfully comes upon information commits no fraud by trading on it.
Can family members be liable under the misappropriation theory?
Yes. Under Rule 10b5-2, certain family relationships create a presumed duty of trust or confidence, so a spouse, parent, child, or sibling who trades on confidential information shared within the family can face misappropriation liability.
What compliance steps reduce misappropriation risk?
Professional firms use information barriers, restricted and watch lists, pre-clearance of personal trades, and written personal-trading policies. Companies should make confidentiality duties explicit in engagement and confidentiality agreements. Individuals should treat confidential information received in any relationship of trust as off-limits for trading.
Speak With a California Securities Attorney
The misappropriation theory reaches far beyond corporate insiders, touching every professional and counterparty who handles confidential market-moving information. The breadth of the doctrine means that a single lapse in handling confidential information can trigger civil and criminal exposure for both the individual and, through control-person liability, the firm that employed or advised. If you are building a compliance program, responding to an SEC or DOJ inquiry, or assessing insider-trading risk for your firm or your executives, Trembach Law Firm can help. Call (818) 514-7680 to discuss your situation with a California securities attorney.
This article is for general informational purposes and is not legal advice. Securities-law liability is fact-specific and depends on the particular relationships and conduct involved. Consult a qualified securities attorney about your circumstances.
Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.
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