SECURITIES | 2026-11-22

The Section 28(e) Soft-Dollar Safe Harbor: How Investment Advisers Can Use Client Commissions to Pay for Research Without Breaching Their Fiduciary Duty

What the soft-dollar safe harbor in Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act protects, the "brokerage and research services" that qualify, the good-faith and mixed-use requirements, and how the safe harbor interacts with an adviser's fiduciary duty of best execution

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

When an investment adviser directs a client's trade to a broker-dealer and pays a commission, the adviser is spending the client's money — and when the commission is higher than the lowest available rate because the broker also provides research the adviser uses, the adviser faces an apparent...

What Soft Dollars Are

"Soft dollars" refers to the use of client brokerage commissions to pay for research and brokerage services that an investment manager uses in managing client accounts. When an adviser directs a client's securities trade to a broker-dealer, the client pays a commission. If the adviser could have obtained execution for a lower commission elsewhere but chose a broker that charges more because that broker also provides research the adviser uses, the adviser has effectively used the client's commission dollars — "soft dollars," as opposed to the adviser's own "hard dollars" — to pay for research. The practice creates an inherent conflict of interest: the adviser receives a benefit (research it would otherwise pay for itself), while the client bears the cost through a higher commission. Absent a safe harbor, an adviser who paid more than the lowest available commission could be accused of breaching its fiduciary duty to the client, because the adviser appears to be favoring its own interest in obtaining research over the client's interest in the lowest execution cost. Congress addressed this tension by enacting a statutory safe harbor — Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) — that, within defined limits, protects a manager from a fiduciary-breach claim based solely on paying more than the lowest commission in exchange for qualifying brokerage and research services.

The Statutory Safe Harbor of Section 28(e)

Section 28(e)(1) provides that a person who exercises investment discretion over an account shall not be deemed to have acted unlawfully or to have breached a fiduciary duty under state or federal law solely by reason of having caused the account to pay a commission in excess of the amount another broker would have charged, if that person determined in good faith that the commission was reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided by the broker-dealer — viewed in terms of either that particular transaction or the person's overall responsibilities to the accounts over which it exercises discretion. The safe harbor thus has several essential elements: the person must exercise investment discretion; the payment must be a commission for effecting securities transactions; the services received must be brokerage and research services as defined; and the manager must make a good-faith determination that the commission is reasonable relative to the value of those services. Section 28(e) is a safe harbor, not a mandate: it does not require an adviser to use soft dollars, and it does not make every soft-dollar arrangement lawful. It protects only arrangements that fit squarely within its terms. An arrangement that falls outside the safe harbor is not automatically unlawful, but it loses the statutory protection and must be justified under ordinary fiduciary principles — a far riskier position for the adviser.

What Qualifies as "Brokerage and Research Services"

The heart of the safe harbor is the statutory definition of brokerage and research services, set out in Section 28(e)(3). A product or service qualifies as research if it constitutes advice, analyses, or reports concerning the value of securities, the advisability of investing in or trading securities, the availability of securities or purchasers/sellers, or concerning issuers, industries, economic factors, portfolio strategy, and the performance of accounts. The SEC has elaborated on this definition in interpretive guidance (including its 2006 interpretive release on client commission practices under Section 28(e)), which frames a three-part test: the manager must determine whether the product or service is eligible research or brokerage under the statutory definition; whether it provides lawful and appropriate assistance to the manager in carrying out its investment decision-making responsibilities; and whether the manager made a good-faith determination that the commissions paid are reasonable in light of the value of the products or services. Brokerage services, under Section 28(e)(3)(C), relate to effecting securities transactions and functions incidental thereto — clearance, settlement, and custody in connection with the trade, within defined temporal limits (generally, the brokerage safe harbor runs from the point at which the manager communicates the order to the point of settlement). The SEC's guidance draws a line between eligible research and brokerage, on one hand, and ineligible items — such as overhead, office equipment, travel, computer hardware for general use, and administrative or "back-office" items — that do not provide the kind of intellectual content or trade-execution assistance the safe harbor protects.

The Good-Faith Reasonableness Determination

Even where a product or service is eligible research or brokerage, the safe harbor applies only if the manager determines in good faith that the commission paid is reasonable in relation to the value of the services. This good-faith determination is a substantive obligation, not a formality. The manager may assess reasonableness either transaction-by-transaction or in terms of its overall responsibilities to all discretionary accounts — recognizing that research obtained through commissions may benefit accounts other than the one that generated the commission. The manager must be prepared to document and support its good-faith conclusion, and a manager that pays elevated commissions without a reasoned basis for believing the services are worth the cost cannot rely on the safe harbor. The SEC's guidance emphasizes that the manager bears the burden of showing that the arrangement fits the safe harbor and that its good-faith determination is supportable. In practice, advisers maintain soft-dollar policies, track the research and brokerage services received against the commissions paid, and periodically evaluate whether the arrangements remain reasonable. The good-faith requirement is what ties the safe harbor back to the adviser's fiduciary role: the safe harbor protects the adviser only to the extent the adviser has genuinely concluded, and can support, that the client commissions are buying services of commensurate value.

Mixed-Use Products and Allocation

A recurring problem is the mixed-use product or service — one that serves both an eligible research or brokerage function and a non-eligible function (for example, a software system used both for investment analysis and for administrative or marketing purposes). The SEC's guidance addresses mixed-use items directly: the manager must make a reasonable allocation of the cost between the eligible portion (which may be paid with soft dollars within the safe harbor) and the ineligible portion (which the manager must pay for with its own hard dollars). The manager must keep adequate records supporting the allocation and the basis for it, and must make a good-faith judgment about the relative uses. A manager that treats an entire mixed-use product as research — paying for the ineligible administrative portion with client commissions — falls outside the safe harbor as to that portion and risks a fiduciary-breach claim and regulatory action. Proper mixed-use allocation is one of the most scrutinized aspects of soft-dollar compliance in SEC examinations, because it is where the line between legitimate research and impermissible use of client commissions for the adviser's own overhead is most often crossed. Advisers accordingly adopt documented allocation methodologies and periodically review them to ensure that only the eligible portion of a mixed-use item is funded with soft dollars. Allocation disputes are factually intensive: because the eligible and ineligible uses of a single system or data service can shift over time, the SEC expects advisers to revisit their allocations rather than set them once, and to retain the contemporaneous records that show how each mixed-use cost was divided between soft and hard dollars, so that the firm can demonstrate — on examination — a reasoned basis for the portion charged to client commissions.

Section 28(e) and the Duty of Best Execution

The safe harbor does not relieve an adviser of its independent duty of best execution — the obligation, grounded in the adviser's fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act (see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6), to seek to obtain the most favorable terms reasonably available for client transactions under the circumstances. Best execution is not simply the lowest commission; it considers the full range of a broker's services, including execution quality, speed, and reliability, as well as research. But Section 28(e) does not authorize an adviser to ignore execution quality in order to steer commissions to research providers. The adviser must still conduct a regular and rigorous evaluation of the execution it obtains, and the soft-dollar arrangement must be consistent with — not a substitute for — that duty. The two concepts work together: Section 28(e) protects the adviser from a claim that paying more than the lowest commission for qualifying research, standing alone, breaches fiduciary duty; the duty of best execution requires that the adviser nonetheless obtain, overall, favorable execution for clients. An adviser that directs trades to a research-providing broker whose execution is materially inferior cannot hide behind Section 28(e), because the safe harbor addresses the commission-for-research conflict, not the separate obligation to execute client trades well.

Disclosure of Soft-Dollar Practices

An adviser's use of soft dollars is a conflict of interest that must be disclosed to clients. Under the Investment Advisers Act and the fiduciary duty it embodies, an adviser must make full and fair disclosure of all material facts, including conflicts, so that clients can give informed consent. Soft-dollar practices are disclosed in the adviser's Form ADV brochure (Part 2A), which requires advisers to describe their soft-dollar arrangements, the types of research and brokerage products and services obtained, whether clients pay higher commissions as a result, the conflicts the arrangements create, and how the adviser addresses them — including whether research benefits accounts other than those paying the commissions. Disclosure must be specific enough to inform clients of the actual practices; boilerplate that merely recites the existence of soft dollars without describing the arrangement may be inadequate. The disclosure obligation is a core part of why soft-dollar compliance matters: even an arrangement that fits within Section 28(e) can give rise to liability if the adviser fails to disclose it properly, because the fiduciary duty requires transparency about the conflict regardless of whether the underlying arrangement is protected by the safe harbor. Advisers therefore pair their soft-dollar policies with careful Form ADV disclosure and periodic review to ensure the disclosure keeps pace with their actual practices.

Compliance and Enforcement Risk

Soft-dollar arrangements are a frequent subject of SEC examination and enforcement, because they sit at the intersection of the adviser's conflict of interest, its fiduciary duty, and the detailed conditions of the safe harbor. Common problem areas include: paying for ineligible products or services with client commissions; failing to allocate mixed-use items properly; inadequate good-faith reasonableness determinations or documentation; deficient disclosure in Form ADV; and using soft dollars in ways inconsistent with best execution. An adviser that strays outside the safe harbor exposes itself not only to a fiduciary-breach theory but also to charges under the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act for failing to disclose or manage the conflict. The practical compliance program for soft dollars includes a written soft-dollar policy, a process for evaluating whether products and services are eligible under the three-part test, documented mixed-use allocations, records supporting the good-faith reasonableness determinations, a best-execution evaluation process, and accurate Form ADV disclosure — all reviewed periodically. For California advisers and fund managers, who are subject to SEC regulation (for larger advisers) or California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation oversight (for smaller state-registered advisers), a disciplined soft-dollar program is the best protection against the regulatory and liability exposure that soft-dollar practices can create.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Section 28(e) soft-dollar safe harbor?

Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)) provides that an investment manager does not breach its fiduciary duty solely by paying a broker more than the lowest commission, if the manager determines in good faith that the commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services the broker provides.

What are "soft dollars"?

Soft dollars are client brokerage commissions used to pay for research and brokerage services the adviser uses, rather than the adviser paying for those services with its own "hard dollars." The practice creates a conflict because the client bears the cost through a higher commission while the adviser receives the research.

What services qualify under the safe harbor?

Under Section 28(e)(3), research means advice, analyses, and reports concerning securities, issuers, industries, economic factors, and portfolio strategy; brokerage means services related to effecting securities transactions. The SEC applies a three-part test: the item must be eligible research or brokerage, provide lawful and appropriate assistance, and pass the good-faith reasonableness determination.

What does not qualify?

Ineligible items include overhead, office equipment, travel, general-use computer hardware, and administrative or back-office functions. Paying for these with client commissions falls outside the safe harbor, so the adviser must pay for them with its own hard dollars.

How are mixed-use products handled?

A product serving both research and non-research purposes must be allocated: the eligible portion may be paid with soft dollars, and the ineligible portion must be paid with the adviser's hard dollars. The adviser must make a reasonable, good-faith allocation and keep records supporting it. Improper allocation is a frequent examination finding.

Does the safe harbor eliminate the duty of best execution?

No. The adviser's fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act (15 U.S.C. § 80b-6) still requires it to seek the most favorable terms reasonably available for client transactions. Section 28(e) protects the commission-for-research arrangement, but the adviser must still obtain favorable overall execution and cannot steer trades to brokers with materially inferior execution.

Must soft-dollar practices be disclosed?

Yes. Soft dollars are a conflict of interest that must be fully and fairly disclosed so clients can give informed consent. Advisers describe their soft-dollar arrangements, the products obtained, the conflicts, and how they address them in Form ADV Part 2A. Inadequate disclosure can create liability even for an arrangement within the safe harbor.

What are the main compliance risks?

Common problems are paying for ineligible items, failing to allocate mixed-use products, weak good-faith determinations or documentation, deficient Form ADV disclosure, and inconsistency with best execution. A written soft-dollar policy, eligibility analysis, documented allocations, and accurate disclosure, reviewed periodically, protect against examination and enforcement risk.

Using Client Commissions for Research the Right Way

Section 28(e) gives investment advisers a defined path to use client commissions for research without, standing alone, breaching their fiduciary duty — but it is a narrow safe harbor that protects only eligible brokerage and research services, supported by a good-faith reasonableness determination, with mixed-use items properly allocated. It does not displace the adviser's duty of best execution or its obligation to disclose soft-dollar conflicts in Form ADV. An adviser that treats Section 28(e) as a blanket license to steer commissions to research providers, pays for ineligible overhead with client money, or fails to disclose the arrangement risks both fiduciary-breach liability and SEC enforcement. The safe harbor rewards discipline: a documented soft-dollar policy, careful eligibility and allocation analysis, a rigorous best-execution process, and specific disclosure. If you are a California investment adviser, fund manager, or broker-dealer structuring soft-dollar arrangements, reviewing your compliance program, or responding to an examination, our firm can help. For related guidance, see our securities and governance practice. Call (818) 514-7680 to discuss an investment-adviser compliance or securities matter with a California attorney.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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