SECURITIES | 2026-11-17

SPACs and De-SPAC Mergers: Shareholder Redemption Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Disclosure Liability

How a special-purpose acquisition company works, why the Delaware courts apply entire fairness to de-SPAC transactions, how the redemption decision depends on disclosure, and the securities-law exposure that follows a bad deal

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

The special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, became one of the most prominent routes to the public markets, offering private companies an alternative to the traditional initial public offering and offering investors a chance to back a sponsor's search for a target. But the SPAC structure carries distinctive legal risks that have generated a wave of litigation and regulatory attention. At the center are two features that set SPACs apart: the public shareholders' right to redeem their shares

How a SPAC Works

A special-purpose acquisition company (SPAC) is a shell company with no operations that raises money in an initial public offering for the sole purpose of acquiring an as-yet-unidentified private company within a deadline set in its governing documents, commonly 18 to 24 months (exchange listing rules cap the period at three years). The cash raised is placed in a trust account, and the SPAC's public investors typically buy units that combine a share of common stock with a warrant or a fraction of a warrant. The SPAC is organized and controlled by a sponsor, which receives a founder stake — commonly around 20 percent of the post-IPO equity — at a nominal price, the so-called promote. The SPAC then searches for a target; when it identifies one, it negotiates a merger, and the combination of the SPAC with the operating target is the de-SPAC transaction, after which the target becomes a public company. The structure is, in effect, a two-stage path to the public markets: first the blind-pool IPO, then the de-SPAC merger that brings an operating business public.

The Redemption Right: The Shareholder's Core Protection

The central protection for SPAC public shareholders is the redemption right. Before the de-SPAC merger closes, each public shareholder may elect to redeem its shares for a pro rata portion of the trust account — essentially getting its money back, typically about the $10 IPO price per share plus accrued interest — rather than remaining invested in the merged company. This right is what makes the SPAC structure attractive to investors: they can back a sponsor's search while retaining the option to exit for cash if they do not like the proposed deal. But the redemption right is only as valuable as the information on which it is exercised. A shareholder deciding whether to redeem or stay must be able to evaluate the target, the deal terms, the dilution from the sponsor's promote and the warrants, and the risks of the combined company. If the disclosures that accompany the redemption decision are false or misleading, the right to redeem is undermined, because the shareholder cannot make an informed choice. This linkage between the redemption decision and disclosure is the heart of de-SPAC litigation.

Why Delaware Applies Entire Fairness: In re MultiPlan

Many SPACs are organized in Delaware (others, notably, in the Cayman Islands), and under the internal affairs doctrine the law of the state of incorporation governs the fiduciary duties that a SPAC's directors and controlling sponsor owe public shareholders. In a landmark decision, In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litigation, 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022) (Will, V.C.), the Delaware Court of Chancery, denying in large part motions to dismiss, held that a de-SPAC transaction could be subject to the exacting entire fairness standard of review, rather than the deferential business-judgment rule. The court reasoned that the SPAC structure is riddled with conflicts of interest: the sponsor and directors stand to profit handsomely from completing almost any deal because of the promote, even a deal that is bad for public shareholders, since the sponsor's nominal-cost founder shares become worthless if no deal closes but valuable if any deal closes. Entire fairness applied because the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the SPAC's controlling stockholder received a unique benefit not shared with the public stockholders and that a majority of the board was not disinterested or independent; the court rejected the argument that conflicts inherent in the SPAC structure should be disregarded. The court also held that the claim was direct, not derivative, because the core harm was the impairment of the public stockholders' informed exercise of their redemption rights through the alleged withholding of material information about the target. The court cautioned that its ruling did not address a hypothetical claim in which disclosure is adequate and the allegations rest only on the conflicts inherent in the SPAC structure. Later Court of Chancery decisions, including Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692 (Del. Ch. 2023), applied the same framework. MultiPlan reframed de-SPAC litigation, establishing that these deals can face searching fiduciary review and that the disclosure supporting the redemption decision is central.

The Sponsor Conflict of Interest

The conflict MultiPlan identified is structural and worth understanding in detail. The sponsor acquires its promote — a large equity stake — for a nominal sum, and that stake has value only if the SPAC completes a de-SPAC merger before its deadline. If the SPAC liquidates without a deal, the sponsor's promote is worthless. This creates a powerful incentive for the sponsor to complete some deal, even a poor one, rather than return the trust money to shareholders. The public shareholders' interest, by contrast, is in either a good deal or the return of their money through redemption or liquidation. The sponsor and the public shareholders are therefore not aligned on the central question — whether to do the deal at all — and the directors, often affiliated with or beholden to the sponsor, may share the sponsor's incentives. This misalignment is why Delaware treats de-SPAC transactions with suspicion and why the fairness of the process and the completeness of the disclosure receive close scrutiny. For investors, the corporate governance implications are significant, because the usual presumption that a board acts in the shareholders' interests does not hold as comfortably in the SPAC context.

Federal Securities Liability in De-SPAC Transactions

Alongside state fiduciary claims, a de-SPAC transaction carries federal securities exposure. The proxy statement or registration statement used to solicit shareholder approval of the de-SPAC merger and to inform the redemption decision is subject to the federal prohibitions on false or misleading statements. Material misstatements or omissions can give rise to claims under Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 for proxy solicitations, under Section 11 of the Securities Act for registration statements, and under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. De-SPAC transactions have been particularly scrutinized for optimistic financial projections about the target's future performance — a feature of many SPAC deals — and for disclosures about the target's business, its risks, and the dilution shareholders face. When a newly public de-SPAC company misses its projections and its stock falls, securities litigation frequently follows, testing whether the de-SPAC disclosures were materially misleading.

The SEC Response and Enhanced Disclosure Rules

The Securities and Exchange Commission responded to the surge in SPAC activity and the attendant investor-protection concerns by adopting rules enhancing the disclosure and liability framework for SPACs and de-SPAC transactions. The rules, adopted on January 24, 2024 and effective July 1, 2024, add a new Subpart 1600 to Regulation S-K and require enhanced disclosures about SPAC sponsors, their compensation, conflicts of interest, and dilution, and they address the treatment of de-SPAC transactions to more closely align them with the protections that apply to traditional IPOs. Among the significant features, the rules require the target company, in certain situations, to sign the de-SPAC registration statement as a co-registrant and thus assume responsibility for its disclosures; require disclosure of any board determination about whether the de-SPAC is advisable and in the best interests of the SPAC and its shareholders, if required by law, and of any outside report, opinion, or appraisal materially relating to the transaction; require disclosure of all material bases and assumptions underlying projections; and adopt a definition of "blank check company" that makes the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements — the projections that had been a hallmark of SPAC marketing — unavailable to SPACs. The regulatory direction has been to treat the de-SPAC as functionally an IPO of the target and to extend comparable disclosure obligations and liability exposure, which raises the stakes for sponsors and advisers and strengthens the information available to shareholders making the redemption decision.

What Shareholders Can Claim When a De-SPAC Goes Bad

When a de-SPAC merger harms public shareholders, the available claims depend on the facts but typically fall into two categories. First, state fiduciary claims against the sponsor and directors, which under MultiPlan may be reviewed for entire fairness where the transaction was conflicted and the disclosure impaired the redemption decision. These claims focus on whether the process was fair and whether shareholders received the material information they needed. Second, federal securities claims under the proxy, registration-statement, and antifraud provisions, which focus on whether the de-SPAC disclosures — including projections and risk disclosures — were materially false or misleading. The two sets of claims are complementary: the fiduciary claims address the conflict and the fairness of the deal, while the securities claims address the accuracy of the disclosures. A shareholder harmed by a de-SPAC merger, and the counsel advising them, must evaluate both, because the structure of the SPAC and the content of its disclosures often give rise to overlapping theories of liability.

Practical Guidance for Sponsors and Directors

For sponsors and directors, the lesson of MultiPlan and the SEC rules is that de-SPAC transactions must be structured and disclosed with the assumption that they may face entire-fairness review and IPO-level securities scrutiny. Sound practice includes ensuring the disclosure that accompanies the redemption decision is complete and accurate — fully describing the target, the deal terms, the dilution, the sponsor conflicts, and the risks — because impaired disclosure is the core vulnerability. It includes considering process protections, such as independent director involvement or an independent committee, that can help establish fairness. And it includes caution about projections, which have become a focal point of both securities litigation and the SEC rules. Sponsors who treat the de-SPAC as the equivalent of an IPO, with commensurate diligence and disclosure, are better positioned than those who rely on the lighter-touch practices of the SPAC boom. For broader coverage, see our securities and governance news.

Why the SPAC Structure Demands Scrutiny

The SPAC is a legitimate and sometimes valuable financing structure, but it concentrates conflicts and depends heavily on disclosure in a way that few other transactions do. The redemption right gives shareholders real protection, but only if they are informed; the sponsor's promote creates a powerful incentive to complete a deal regardless of merit; and the de-SPAC proxy carries the full weight of the federal securities laws. Delaware, through MultiPlan, and the SEC, through its enhanced rules, have both moved to strengthen the protections for public shareholders and to hold sponsors and directors to higher standards. For investors, the result is a structure that can be approached with appropriate caution and, where a deal has gone wrong, with an understanding of the fiduciary and securities claims that may be available. For sponsors and boards, it is a structure that rewards rigorous disclosure and fair process and punishes shortcuts. The arc of the law since the SPAC boom has been consistent: both the Delaware courts and the SEC have moved to close the gap between the lighter-touch practices of the SPAC structure and the robust investor protections that attend a conventional IPO, so that the path a company takes to the public markets matters less and less to the disclosure and accountability it faces. A sponsor or director who internalizes that convergence, and who treats every de-SPAC as if it will be judged by IPO standards, is unlikely to be surprised by how a court or regulator later views the deal. For related reading, see our securities and governance coverage.

The Federal Statutory Framework for De-SPAC Liability

The federal securities claims that arise from a de-SPAC transaction rest on specific statutory and regulatory provisions worth identifying precisely. The prohibition on false or misleading proxy solicitations appears in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act) and its implementing rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (Rule 14a-9), which together reach material misstatements and omissions in the proxy that solicits approval of the de-SPAC merger and informs the redemption decision. Liability for a materially false registration statement used in the de-SPAC arises under 15 U.S.C. § 77k (Section 11 of the Securities Act), which imposes strict liability on the issuer for material misstatements and liability on other specified defendants, such as directors and underwriters, subject to a due-diligence defense. And the general antifraud provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Section 10(b)) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5), reaches fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, including the shares retained or sold around the de-SPAC. The forward-looking-statement safe harbor for projections, found in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (the PSLRA safe harbor), has been a focal point because de-SPAC transactions relied heavily on projections; the SEC's 2024 rules made that safe harbor unavailable to SPACs, including for de-SPAC projections, bringing the exposure in line with that of a traditional IPO, where the safe harbor does not apply to statements made in connection with the offering. Understanding which provision governs a given claim matters, because the elements, the available defenses, and the measure of liability differ across them — Section 11's strict or near-strict liability is very different from the scienter requirement of a Rule 10b-5 claim.

Related Guides

For related reading, see our securities and governance news, and learn more about the firm's work in securities and corporate governance.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a SPAC?

A special-purpose acquisition company is a shell company that raises money in an IPO to acquire an unidentified private company within a set period. The cash is held in trust, a sponsor controls the SPAC and receives a founder stake, and the eventual merger with an operating target — the de-SPAC — takes that target public.

What is the redemption right?

Before the de-SPAC merger closes, public shareholders may redeem their shares for a pro rata share of the trust account — essentially their money back — instead of remaining invested in the merged company. It is the SPAC's core investor protection, but it depends on accurate disclosure to be exercised intelligently.

Why do Delaware courts apply entire fairness to de-SPAC deals?

In In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litigation (Del. Ch. 2022), the court held that a de-SPAC transaction can face entire-fairness review where a conflicted controlling sponsor received a benefit not shared with public shareholders and a majority of the board was not disinterested or independent: the sponsor profits from completing almost any deal because of the promote. The court treated the claim as direct because allegedly misleading disclosure impaired the public shareholders' redemption decision.

What is the sponsor promote?

The promote is the large founder equity stake — commonly around 20 percent — that the sponsor acquires for a nominal sum. It has value only if a de-SPAC merger closes, which gives the sponsor a strong incentive to complete a deal even a poor one, rather than return the trust money to shareholders.

What federal securities claims can arise from a de-SPAC?

The de-SPAC proxy or registration statement is subject to the federal prohibitions on false or misleading statements, so claims can arise under Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, Section 11 of the Securities Act, and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Optimistic projections and risk disclosures about the target are frequent targets of litigation.

What did the SEC SPAC rules change?

The SEC rules adopted on January 24, 2024 (effective July 1, 2024) require enhanced disclosure about sponsors, their compensation, conflicts, and dilution, can make the target company a co-registrant on the de-SPAC registration statement, treat the de-SPAC more like an IPO of the target with comparable obligations, and make the PSLRA forward-looking-statement safe harbor unavailable to SPACs.

What can shareholders claim when a de-SPAC goes bad?

Typically two categories: state fiduciary claims against the sponsor and directors, which under MultiPlan may face entire-fairness review where the deal was conflicted and disclosure was impaired, and federal securities claims challenging the accuracy of the de-SPAC disclosures, including projections. The two theories often overlap.

How can sponsors reduce their exposure?

By ensuring complete, accurate disclosure supporting the redemption decision, considering process protections such as independent director involvement, and exercising caution with projections. Treating the de-SPAC as the equivalent of an IPO, with commensurate diligence and disclosure, is the prudent approach given MultiPlan and the SEC rules.

Speak With a California Securities Attorney

If you invested in a SPAC and were harmed by a conflicted or poorly disclosed de-SPAC merger, or you are a sponsor or director structuring a transaction, Trembach Law Firm can help. We advise on the fiduciary duties and disclosure obligations that govern de-SPAC deals, the entire-fairness standard under Delaware law, and the federal securities exposure that follows a bad deal. For a consultation, call (818) 514-7680. Because de-SPAC transactions concentrate conflicts and depend on disclosure, careful attention to fairness and disclosure is essential for sponsors and investors alike.

This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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