EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION | 2026-11-02

Arbitration Fee Default Under Sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 in California: 2026 Guide

If a California employer pays arbitration fees more than 30 days late, it is in material breach and waives the right to compel arbitration.

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

If your California employer dragged you into arbitration and then stalled by not paying the arbitrator fees on time, the law is on your side. Under Code of Civil Procedure 1281.97 and 1281.98, an employer that fails to pay required arbitration fees within 30 days of the due date is in material breac

Why a Late Arbitration Fee Can Send Your Case Back to Court

When a California worker signs a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, the worker gives up the right to a jury and agrees to resolve disputes in a private forum the employer usually chose. For years, some employers exploited that forum by stalling, delaying the arbitration they themselves demanded by simply not paying the arbitrator fees, leaving the employee stranded in a process that could not move forward and could not be taken back to court. In 2019 the Legislature slammed that door shut with a strict new rule that converts an employer late fee payment into an immediate forfeiture of the right to arbitrate.

The mechanism lives in Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1281.97, 1281.98, and 1281.99, and it is one of the most powerful tools a California employee has when stuck in a stalled arbitration. The rule is unforgiving by design, and both workers and employers need to understand exactly how it operates.

The problem the statute addresses was real and widespread. Arbitration providers typically will not proceed until the fees are paid, so an employer that simply sits on an invoice can freeze the case indefinitely. The employee, having been compelled out of court, could not return to the courtroom and could not move forward in arbitration, a procedural limbo that favored the party that drafted the agreement. Some employers used this dynamic as leverage, knowing that a stalled claim pressures a worker to abandon the case or accept a low settlement. The Legislature concluded that a party who demands arbitration and then refuses to fund it should forfeit the right to that forum, and it wrote a rule precise enough that the forfeiture would be automatic rather than discretionary.

The Statutory Scheme: Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1281.97, 1281.98, and 1281.99

These sections apply to employment and consumer arbitrations governed by a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that requires the drafting party, typically the employer, to pay certain fees and costs. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.97 governs the fees required to initiate an arbitration. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.98 governs the fees required to continue an arbitration that is already underway. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.99 provides the sanctions that follow a default under either section.

The logic is simple and deliberate. Because the employer drafted the agreement and compelled the employee into arbitration, the employer bears the burden of keeping that forum open by paying its share of the fees on time. If the employer cannot or will not fund the forum it insisted upon, the employee should not be trapped. The statutes shift the risk of a stalled arbitration onto the party that controls the agreement and the obligation to pay.

The statutes apply specifically to the drafting party, defined as the company or person that drafted the arbitration agreement and imposed it as a condition of employment or of obtaining goods or services. This targeting is deliberate. The rules do not burden the employee, who did not draft the agreement and does not control the fee obligations; they burden the party that wrote the agreement, chose the arbitral forum, and agreed to pay the forum fees. By placing the risk of a stalled arbitration on the drafter, the Legislature aligned the consequences with control, the party in the best position to pay on time bears the loss if it does not.

The Strict 30-Day Clock

The heart of the scheme is a 30-day deadline. Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.97, if the employer fails to pay the fees required to initiate the arbitration within 30 days after the due date, the employer is in material breach of the arbitration agreement. Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.98, the same 30-day rule applies to the fees required to continue an already-pending arbitration. The due date is set when the invoice issues, and the clock runs from there.

What makes the rule so potent is its mechanical simplicity. There is no inquiry into why the payment was late, no requirement that the employee show harm, and no opportunity for the employer to cure after the 30 days expire. The statute treats the arbitration-provider rule that payment is due upon receipt as the measuring point, and it counts 30 days from there. Payment on day 31 is too late, full stop.

The statute removes much of the ambiguity that ordinarily surrounds a payment deadline. It specifies that the fees are due upon receipt of the invoice unless the arbitration agreement or the provider rules expressly state otherwise, and it counts the 30 days from that due date. Any extension granted by the provider does not restart the statutory clock; the Legislature made clear that the grace period is a creature of statute, not of the provider internal practices. This precision is intentional. A vague or forgiving deadline would reintroduce exactly the gamesmanship the statute was meant to eliminate, so the drafters left little room for an employer to argue about when the clock started or whether it could be paused.

Material Breach and Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration

When the 30-day deadline passes without payment, the statute declares that the employer is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel the employee to proceed with or participate in arbitration. In other words, the employer forfeits the very right it bargained for. Having dragged the worker out of court and into arbitration, the employer that then fails to fund that arbitration loses the ability to keep the worker there.

This is not a mere procedural slap. It is a substantive forfeiture that restores the employee access to the courts. The breach is defined by statute as material, which removes any argument that the late payment was a trivial or technical lapse. The Legislature made the consequence automatic precisely so that employers could not litigate their way out of their own delay.

The choice to label the lapse a material breach, rather than a mere default, was a deliberate use of contract vocabulary. In ordinary contract law, only a material breach excuses the other party from further performance and allows that party to treat the contract as broken. By declaring the late payment a material breach as a matter of law, the Legislature slotted the fee-default rule into familiar contract principles: the employer broke a material term of the very agreement it is trying to enforce, so it cannot simultaneously demand that the employee honor that agreement. This framing is central to the employee counter to any FAA preemption argument, because it shows the rule enforces the arbitration contract rather than singling arbitration out for disfavor.

Espinoza v. Superior Court: No Substantial Compliance, No Prejudice Exception

California courts have enforced the 30-day rule strictly. In Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 761, the Court of Appeal confronted an employer that paid the arbitration fees late and argued the delay should be excused because it substantially complied and the employee suffered no prejudice. The court rejected both arguments. It held that the statute means what it says: payment within 30 days is mandatory, and there is no substantial-compliance exception and no prejudice requirement.

Espinoza confirmed that the statute imposes a bright-line rule. The employer intent, good faith, or lack of intent to stall is irrelevant; the only question is whether the fees were paid within 30 days of the due date. If they were not, the employer is in material breach as a matter of law, and the employee gains the statutory remedies. This strict construction is faithful to the Legislature purpose of ending fee-based stalling and protecting workers from being trapped in a paralyzed forum.

Espinoza reasoning rested on the statutory text and purpose. The court observed that the Legislature chose a bright-line rule precisely to avoid the fact-intensive disputes about good faith, substantial compliance, and prejudice that had allowed employers to delay. Reading an implied substantial-compliance or prejudice exception into the statute would reinstate exactly the uncertainty the Legislature sought to eliminate, undermining the protection the rule was designed to provide. The court therefore enforced the deadline as written. Subsequent appellate decisions have largely followed this strict approach, treating the 30-day rule as a hard line and rejecting employer efforts to excuse late payment on equitable grounds.

The Employee's Choices After a Default

Once the employer is in default, the statutes give the employee a menu of options. The employee may withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, effectively undoing the order compelling arbitration and returning to the courtroom the employee was originally forced to leave. Alternatively, the employee may elect to continue the arbitration if the arbitration provider agrees to proceed, or may compel the employer to pay and continue in the arbitral forum.

Most employees who have been stalled choose to return to court, where they regain the right to a jury, broader discovery, and public proceedings. The ability to withdraw is the practical engine of the statute: it turns the employer delay into a loss of the forum the employer wanted, rather than an indefinite limbo for the worker. The employee makes the election, and the employer cannot force the worker back into the arbitration it broke.

When the employee elects to return to court, the practical effect is a reset to the litigation posture that existed before arbitration was compelled. The employee can conduct full civil discovery, including depositions and document demands often curtailed in arbitration, present the case to a jury, and pursue the public accountability that a courtroom provides. For many workers, particularly those with claims that benefit from the disclosure and precedent of public litigation, this return to court is a substantial strategic gain, not merely a procedural one. The employer, having forfeited the forum it chose, cannot dictate the terms of the employee return and cannot force renewed arbitration of the withdrawn claim.

Mandatory Sanctions Under § 1281.99

The forfeiture is not the only consequence. Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.99 makes monetary sanctions mandatory. The statute provides that a court shall impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party that materially breaches the arbitration agreement by failing to pay within the 30-day window, ordering that party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees and costs, the employee incurred as a result of the material breach. The word shall is critical; the sanction is not discretionary.

The court also has discretion to impose additional sanctions, including evidentiary, terminating, and contempt sanctions, where the circumstances warrant. Together, § 1281.99 ensures that an employer that stalls does not merely lose the forum but also compensates the worker for the wasted expense and may face escalating penalties. This combination of mandatory fee-shifting and potential case-ending sanctions gives the statute real teeth.

The mandatory nature of the fee award changes the economics of delay for both sides. An employer can no longer treat a late payment as a costless gamble, hoping the employee will not press the point, because the statute guarantees that a successful employee recovers the expenses the breach caused. For the employee, the fee-shifting provision makes it worthwhile to enforce the deadline even when the amount of the arbitration fees is modest, since the employee is made whole for the cost of litigating the breach. In practice, this encourages employees and their counsel to monitor payment deadlines closely and to move promptly when an employer misses the window, confident that the statute backs the effort with a mandatory sanction.

The FAA Preemption Question

Employers facing these consequences frequently argue that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California fee-default statutes. The FAA, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 and following, embodies a strong federal policy favoring arbitration, and under United States Supreme Court precedent it preempts state rules that single out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment or that stand as an obstacle to the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. Employers contend that a rule declaring automatic material breach for a late fee does exactly that.

Employees respond that the statutes do not disfavor arbitration at all; they enforce arbitration agreements by making sure the forum actually functions, applying ordinary contract principles of material breach to the party that failed to perform. The preemption question is being actively litigated, and a related case addressing whether the FAA preempts these provisions is pending before the California Supreme Court. Until that question is resolved, the statutes remain enforceable in California state courts, and Espinoza remains binding appellate authority, so employers should assume the 30-day rule applies and comply with it.

The preemption debate turns on a well-worn principle of federal arbitration law. The United States Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state rules that discriminate against arbitration or that interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitration, but it has also recognized that generally applicable contract defenses, and rules that merely enforce arbitration agreements, survive. The employee argument is that the fee-default statutes fall on the permissible side of that line: they apply ordinary material-breach principles to the party that failed to perform its own obligation to fund the forum, and they do not refuse to enforce arbitration agreements so much as hold a breaching drafter to the consequences of its breach. How the California Supreme Court ultimately resolves this question will determine the statute reach, but until it does, prudent employers treat the deadline as binding and pay on time.

Employers also have a legitimate interest in understanding how to avoid a default that is largely self-inflicted. The most common cause of a late payment is not a deliberate strategy but an administrative breakdown, an invoice routed to the wrong department, a lapse during a transition of counsel, or a misunderstanding about who bears responsibility for payment. Because the statute offers no cure once the 30 days expire, employers who rely on arbitration agreements should build internal controls that treat arbitration invoices as time-critical, with clear ownership, prompt routing, and a calendared deadline well inside the statutory window. The cost of that diligence is trivial compared with the consequence of losing the right to arbitrate and paying mandatory sanctions.

Deadlines, Remedies, and Practical Steps

For an employee stuck in a stalled arbitration, the key is to watch the invoice dates. When the arbitration provider sends the employer an invoice, the 30-day clock starts, and the employee or counsel should calendar the deadline carefully. If the employer does not pay within 30 days, the employee can immediately move to withdraw from arbitration and return to court under Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.98, and can seek mandatory sanctions under Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.99. Prompt action preserves the remedy and the evidentiary record of the default.

For employers, the compliance lesson is blunt: pay arbitration invoices immediately and never let the 30-day window lapse, because there is no cure and no substantial-compliance defense. An employer that relies on an arbitration agreement must fund the forum it chose. These rules intersect with the broader fairness limits on mandatory arbitration, and workers facing a petition to compel arbitration under Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2 should know their rights. For related reading on how California protects workers from abusive workplace practices, see our discussion of wage theft as grand theft under AB 1003, and track current developments on our California employment law news page.

If your employer stalled the arbitration it forced you into by paying the fees late, you may be entitled to withdraw your claim to court and recover mandatory sanctions. Trembach Law Firm enforces the arbitration fee-default rules for California workers and advises employers on avoiding a costly default. To find out whether a late fee payment has freed your case from arbitration, call Trembach Law Firm at (213) 645-2246 for a confidential consultation.

Frequently Asked Questions

What happens if my employer pays the arbitration fees late?

Under Code Civ. Proc. 1281.97 and 1281.98, if the employer fails to pay the required arbitration fees within 30 days after the due date, the employer is in material breach, waives its right to compel arbitration, and you may withdraw your claim and return to court.

Is there any excuse for paying a few days late?

No. In Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 761, the court held there is no substantial-compliance exception and no requirement that you show prejudice. Payment on day 31 is a material breach as a matter of law, regardless of the employer good faith.

What can I do once the employer is in default?

You may withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in court, or you may elect to continue in arbitration. Most workers return to court to regain a jury trial and broader discovery. The choice is yours, and the employer cannot force you back into the arbitration it broke.

Can I recover my attorney fees?

Yes. Code Civ. Proc. 1281.99 makes monetary sanctions mandatory, requiring the court to order the breaching employer to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees and costs, you incurred because of the material breach, with additional sanctions available in the court discretion.

Does the Federal Arbitration Act override these California rules?

Employers argue the FAA, at 9 U.S.C. 1 and following, preempts the fee-default statutes, while employees argue the statutes simply enforce the agreement. The question is being litigated and a related case is pending before the California Supreme Court, but the rules remain enforceable in California state courts for now.

This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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