EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION | 2026-11-09
Arbitration Unconscionability After OTO v. Kho in California (2026)
How a California worker can show an employment arbitration agreement is too one-sided and unfairly imposed to enforce.
By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published
A signed arbitration agreement can send a worker’s entire case into a private process they never meaningfully chose. California law refuses to enforce such agreements when they are unconscionable, and the California Supreme Court’s decision in OTO v. Kho sets out exactly what a worker mu
When an Arbitration Agreement Can Be Thrown Out
Many California employers require workers to sign arbitration agreements that send any future dispute to a private arbitrator instead of a courtroom. Those agreements are often enforceable, but not always. California law lets a court refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that is unconscionable — so one-sided and unfairly imposed that enforcing it would be unjust. The leading modern decision on that doctrine in the employment context is OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111.
Unconscionability is not a magic word that voids any arbitration clause an employee dislikes. It is a demanding, fact-specific doctrine with two required components. Understanding what a worker must show — and what an employer must avoid — is the difference between a dispute heard by a neutral judge and jury and one funneled into a costly private process the worker never meaningfully agreed to.
The stakes are high because arbitration changes far more than the venue. It usually means no jury, limited discovery, a confidential proceeding, and restricted appellate review. For a worker with a strong harassment or wage claim, being forced into a one-sided private forum can quietly gut the value of the case. That is why California courts scrutinize these agreements carefully and why the unconscionability doctrine, rooted in Civ. Code § 1670.5, remains one of the most important tools a worker has.
The Two Faces of Unconscionability
Civ. Code § 1670.5 codifies the court’s power to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or clause. California courts analyze two distinct dimensions. Procedural unconscionability looks at how the agreement was made — the circumstances of oppression and surprise surrounding its formation. Substantive unconscionability looks at what the agreement actually says — whether its terms are overly harsh, one-sided, or unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.
A court must find both procedural and substantive unconscionability before it will refuse to enforce the agreement. One without the other is not enough. An agreement signed under pressure but with perfectly fair terms will be enforced; so will a harsh agreement that was genuinely, knowingly negotiated. It is the combination — an unfair bargain unfairly imposed — that triggers the doctrine, which is why both prongs must be proven.
The requirement of both prongs keeps the doctrine from swallowing the general rule that people are bound by what they sign. California respects freedom of contract, and most signed agreements are enforced. Unconscionability is the narrow exception for bargains that are both procedurally and substantively defective, and a worker challenging an agreement must be prepared to show evidence on each side of that equation rather than simply arguing that the clause is unfair.
The Sliding Scale
The two prongs do not operate in fixed proportions. California applies a sliding scale: the more substantively oppressive the contract terms, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to conclude that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. A severely one-sided agreement can be struck down with a relatively modest showing of procedural unfairness, while a mild substantive problem may require strong proof of oppression in formation.
OTO v. Kho illustrates the scale in action. The agreement there was both highly procedurally unconscionable — presented in a dense, hard-to-read form, with little time or explanation, as a condition of continued employment — and substantively unconscionable because the process it imposed was so costly and complex that it effectively denied the employee an accessible forum. The combination tipped the scale decisively against enforcement.
The sliding scale has a practical consequence for how cases are built. A worker who faced extreme pressure in signing but whose agreement is only moderately one-sided can still prevail, and so can a worker who signed with relatively little pressure but under terms that are grossly unfair. The lawyer’s task is to marshal whatever evidence is strongest on either axis, because a powerful showing on one prong lowers what is needed on the other.
Procedural Unconscionability in the Employment Setting
Employment arbitration agreements are classic contracts of adhesion — standardized forms drafted by the stronger party and presented to the employee on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. OTO v. Kho recognized that the adhesive nature of such agreements supplies a baseline of procedural unconscionability, which can be heightened by surprise or oppression in how the agreement was presented.
In Kho, the court pointed to several aggravating features: the agreement was conveyed in a single dense paragraph of highly technical legal language, filled with complex sentences that few employees could parse; it was presented along with other hiring paperwork by a low-level employee who offered no explanation; the worker was given little time and no meaningful opportunity to negotiate; and signing was effectively required to keep the job. Those circumstances pushed the procedural unconscionability toward the high end of the scale.
The lesson for workers is that the manner of signing matters as much as the signature itself. Was the agreement buried in a stack of onboarding forms? Was it in English for a worker who primarily speaks another language? Was there any explanation, any time to read it, any chance to ask questions or to decline? Each of those facts bears on oppression and surprise, and together they can establish a strong procedural showing even where the worker undeniably signed.
Substantive Unconscionability and the Lost Forum
On the substantive side, OTO v. Kho focused on what the arbitration process would cost the employee in practical terms. The worker had given up access to a Berman hearing — the streamlined, low-cost, employee-friendly administrative process for wage claims before the Labor Commissioner, in which workers can appear without a lawyer and the state helps develop the case. In its place the agreement imposed a complex, litigation-style arbitration that an ordinary employee could not realistically navigate without hiring counsel.
The court reasoned that an arbitration process so expensive and procedurally forbidding that it effectively deprives a worker of any accessible forum for a wage claim is substantively unconscionable. The loss of the Berman forum was not fatal by itself, but the replacement process had to offer an affordable, accessible alternative. When it did not, the agreement failed the substantive prong.
Other terms commonly raise substantive concerns: clauses that shorten the statute of limitations, that bar certain remedies, that require the employee to pay fees they would never face in court, that let the employer choose the arbitrator, or that permit the employer to sue in court while confining the employee to arbitration. Each of these one-sided features adds weight to the substantive side of the scale, and several together can show that the agreement was engineered to disadvantage the worker.
The Armendariz Minimum-Fairness Requirements
The substantive analysis builds on Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, which set the floor for enforceable employment arbitration of unwaivable statutory claims. Armendariz requires that the arbitration provide for a neutral arbitrator, adequate discovery, a written award permitting limited judicial review, all types of relief that would be available in court, and — critically — that the employer pay the costs unique to arbitration so the employee is not forced to bear expenses they would never face in court.
An agreement that violates the Armendariz requirements — for example, by splitting or imposing arbitrator fees on the worker, slashing available remedies, or gutting discovery — is substantively unconscionable in those respects. Employers that try to use arbitration to shrink what an employee can recover, or to make the process unaffordable, run directly into the Armendariz floor and risk having the agreement struck or reformed.
Armendariz is particularly important for FEHA claims such as discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, which are unwaivable statutory rights. An arbitration agreement covering those claims must meet every Armendariz requirement to be enforceable. A worker whose discrimination claim is being pushed into arbitration should check the agreement against each Armendariz element, because a shortfall on any of them is a direct substantive-unconscionability argument.
Severance Versus Voiding the Whole Agreement
When a court finds unconscionable terms, it does not always void the entire agreement. Civ. Code § 1670.5 allows a court to refuse to enforce the unconscionable clause, to limit its application, or to refuse to enforce the contract as a whole. The remedy depends on how thoroughly the unconscionability permeates the agreement. A single offending clause can sometimes be severed, leaving a valid arbitration agreement behind.
But where the agreement is permeated by unconscionability — multiple one-sided terms reflecting a systematic effort to disadvantage the employee — courts refuse to save it by severance, because doing so would reward the drafter for overreaching. OTO v. Kho reflects the view that an agreement too tainted to fix is better refused altogether than rewritten by the court into something the parties never agreed to.
This is why a worker’s challenge should identify every unconscionable feature, not just one. A single bad clause invites severance and an order compelling arbitration under a cleaned-up agreement. A showing that the agreement is shot through with one-sided terms supports refusing enforcement entirely and keeping the dispute in court, which is usually the worker’s goal.
How the Federal Arbitration Act Fits
Employers frequently invoke the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to argue that California cannot disfavor arbitration. The key point is that unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense — it applies to all contracts, not just arbitration agreements — and the FAA preserves such generally applicable defenses. A California court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement on unconscionability grounds so long as it is applying neutral contract principles and not singling out arbitration for hostile treatment.
That distinction is where many arbitration fights are won or lost. A worker challenging an agreement must frame the attack in terms of ordinary unconscionability doctrine as applied in OTO v. Kho and Armendariz, not as a general objection to arbitration. Done correctly, the challenge survives FAA preemption; done loosely, it invites reversal. This is technical terrain where experienced counsel matters.
The FAA also shapes the remedy. Because federal law favors arbitration, a court that finds only a minor, severable defect will often sever it and compel arbitration rather than discard the agreement. The worker who wants to stay in court therefore benefits from demonstrating that the defects are pervasive and reflect a deliberate one-sidedness, which is the kind of showing that OTO v. Kho found sufficient to deny enforcement altogether.
Practical Steps If You Signed an Arbitration Agreement
Signing an arbitration agreement does not necessarily mean a worker has given up the right to challenge it. A worker should keep a copy of the agreement and any surrounding onboarding materials, note how and when it was presented, whether anyone explained it, how much time was allowed, and whether signing was required to keep the job. Those formation facts drive the procedural prong.
On the substantive side, read the agreement for cost-shifting, remedy limits, shortened deadlines, one-sided carve-outs that let the employer sue in court while the employee must arbitrate, and discovery restrictions. Many related agreements, such as confidentiality clauses, raise their own enforceability questions, which we address in our guide to NDA enforceability in California. An attorney can assess whether the combination of procedural and substantive problems clears the sliding-scale threshold.
What OTO v. Kho Teaches About Low-Wage Workers
OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) is notable for how closely the California Supreme Court examined the circumstances of signing. The agreement was presented to a low-wage employee with little time and no explanation, in dense, single-spaced text, by a messenger who waited for the signature, and it waived the worker’s access to the Labor Commissioner’s accessible Berman hearing in favor of a complex civil-style arbitration. The Court found a high degree of procedural unconscionability in that manner of presentation and substantive unconscionability in the forum the worker was pushed into, and it refused to enforce the agreement.
The decision signals that courts will scrutinize the real-world conditions under which employment arbitration agreements are signed, especially for vulnerable workers. Take-it-or-leave-it presentation, no opportunity to review or consult counsel, and the surrender of a simple statutory remedy for an expensive and opaque process all weigh toward unenforceability under the sliding scale.
Arbitration and PAGA After Viking River and Adolph
Representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act occupy their own space in the arbitration landscape. In Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) the United States Supreme Court held that an employer could compel arbitration of an employee’s individual PAGA claim. The California Supreme Court then addressed what remains, holding in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) that a worker who is sent to arbitration on her individual PAGA claim still retains standing to pursue the representative PAGA claims on behalf of other employees in court. The two decisions together mean an arbitration clause can split a PAGA case but cannot extinguish the representative action.
For a California worker, this is a meaningful limit on what arbitration can accomplish. Even a valid agreement that survives an unconscionability challenge will not necessarily strip away the ability to vindicate statewide Labor Code penalties through a representative PAGA claim, which keeps a powerful enforcement tool available despite the arbitration clause.
The Employer Bears the Cost of Arbitration
A recurring source of unfairness in employment arbitration is cost, and California law addresses it directly. Under Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services (2000), an employer that imposes mandatory arbitration of statutory claims must pay the type of costs unique to arbitration, such as the arbitrator’s fees, so the employee is not forced to bear expenses she would never face in court. A clause that saddles the worker with those costs is a classic marker of substantive unconscionability. The Legislature reinforced this through Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1281.97 and 1281.98, which require the employer to pay arbitration fees within strict deadlines or be found in material breach, and Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022) applied those deadlines strictly, with no substantial-compliance escape hatch.
These cost rules give employees real leverage. If an employer drafts around its obligation to pay, or misses the statutory payment deadlines, the worker may be able to avoid arbitration entirely and return to court, or hold the employer to have waived its right to compel arbitration, independent of any unconscionability showing.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does signing an arbitration agreement mean I can never go to court?
Not necessarily. If the agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable under OTO v. Kho and Civ. Code § 1670.5, a court can refuse to enforce it. Whether yours qualifies depends on how it was presented and what its terms say.
What do I have to prove to beat an arbitration agreement?
You must show both procedural unconscionability (oppression or surprise in how the agreement was made) and substantive unconscionability (overly harsh or one-sided terms). California applies a sliding scale, so a strong showing on one prong reduces how much you need on the other.
What was important about the Berman hearing in OTO v. Kho?
The employee had given up access to a Berman wage-claim hearing, an accessible, low-cost administrative forum. The court found that replacing it with a complex, expensive arbitration the worker could not realistically use without a lawyer helped make the agreement substantively unconscionable.
Can the employer make me pay for the arbitration?
Generally no, for unwaivable statutory claims. Under Armendariz v. Foundation Health, the employer must bear the costs unique to arbitration so the employee is not forced to pay expenses they would not face in court. Fee-shifting onto the worker is a common substantive defect.
Can a court fix a bad clause instead of voiding the whole agreement?
Sometimes. Under Civ. Code § 1670.5 a court may sever a single unconscionable clause and compel arbitration under the rest. But where unconscionability permeates the agreement, courts refuse to rewrite it and decline to enforce it as a whole.
Does the Federal Arbitration Act stop California from applying this doctrine?
No. Unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense that the FAA preserves, so a California court may apply it as long as it treats arbitration agreements the same as other contracts rather than singling them out.
If your employer is trying to force a dispute into arbitration under an agreement you never understood or that is stacked against you, Trembach Law Firm can evaluate whether it is unconscionable and unenforceable. Call Trembach Law Firm at (213) 645-2246 for a confidential review. Follow developments on our employment law news page, and read our related guide to confidentiality agreement and NDA enforceability in California.
This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.
Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.
Trembach Law Firm | 27001 Agoura Road, Suite 350, Calabasas, CA 91301