MESOTHELIOMA | 2026-11-09
Beating Summary Judgment in a California Asbestos Case: The Defendant’s Burden Under Aguilar and Andrews
How Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield and Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2) stop asbestos defendants from winning on a factual vacuum
By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published
In nearly every California asbestos case, the defendants file motions for summary judgment arguing the plaintiff cannot prove exposure to their particular product. Whether those motions succeed often decides whether a dying mesothelioma plaintiff ever reaches a jury. California law gives plaintiffs
For a person diagnosed with mesothelioma, time is the enemy. The disease is aggressive, the prognosis is short, and the legal system’s response to that reality is a set of procedures meant to get asbestos cases to trial quickly. Defendants push back with a familiar weapon: the motion for summary judgment, filed on the theory that the plaintiff cannot identify exposure to their specific product. Understanding how California law allocates the burden on these motions, under Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 and Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, is essential to keeping a meritorious asbestos case alive.
What Summary Judgment Is, and Why It Matters in Asbestos Cases
Summary judgment is a procedure that lets a court decide a case without trial when there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In asbestos litigation, defendants use it to test the weakest link in the plaintiff’s case: product identification. Because asbestos exposure often occurred decades before diagnosis, and because the exposed worker may be too ill to recall every product or may have already died, defendants argue the plaintiff simply cannot prove that their product caused the disease.
The stakes are enormous. A plaintiff who loses summary judgment against a solvent defendant may lose the ability to recover anything meaningful, especially where many original asbestos manufacturers are bankrupt and their liabilities are channeled to trusts. Defeating the motion keeps the defendant in the case, preserves settlement leverage, and lets the plaintiff present the exposure evidence to a jury under the substantial-factor causation standard.
Aguilar and the Moving Defendant’s Burden
The governing decision is Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., where the California Supreme Court comprehensively addressed the summary-judgment standard after the Legislature amended section 437c. Although Aguilar arose in an antitrust context, its summary-judgment holdings apply across California civil litigation, including asbestos cases, and courts cite it constantly in that setting.
Aguilar established that a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that no such issue exists. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2), a defendant meets its burden by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense. Critically, a defendant may rely on the absence of evidence to support the plaintiff’s case, but it cannot simply point to the plaintiff’s lack of evidence in the abstract.
The Supreme Court made clear what this requires. The defendant must present evidence, through discovery responses, admissions, or otherwise, that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence needed to support an essential element, such as exposure to the defendant’s product. A conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no proof, unsupported by evidence that the plaintiff’s discovery has been exhausted, does not satisfy the moving defendant’s burden. Only if the defendant carries that initial burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff to show a triable issue.
Andrews v. Foster Wheeler and the Plaintiff’s Response
The application of Aguilar to asbestos cases was sharpened in Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96. In Andrews, the defendant moved for summary judgment based on "factually devoid" discovery responses, arguing the plaintiffs could not show exposure to its equipment. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, emphasizing that a defendant cannot meet its burden merely by arguing the plaintiff’s discovery responses lack detail.
Andrews held that to shift the burden, a defendant relying on factually devoid discovery responses must show that the plaintiff has had an adequate opportunity for discovery and still cannot produce exposure evidence. The court recognized that asbestos plaintiffs often cannot recall product names from decades past, but that circumstantial evidence, such as the type of work performed, the presence of the defendant’s product at the worksite, and co-worker testimony, can establish a reasonable inference of exposure. Where such an inference is possible, summary judgment must be denied.
Together, Aguilar and Andrews create a demanding standard for asbestos defendants. It is not enough to say the plaintiff cannot remember the product. The defendant must demonstrate, with evidence, that after a full opportunity for discovery the plaintiff has no circumstantial route to proving exposure. In practice, this is difficult, because asbestos exposure can so often be shown through the circumstances of the plaintiff’s work.
What Counts as Exposure Evidence
The substantive question underlying the summary-judgment analysis is whether the plaintiff can show exposure to the defendant’s asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease, the causation standard articulated in Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953. Direct evidence, such as the plaintiff’s own testimony naming a product, is powerful but not required. Circumstantial evidence frequently carries the day.
Co-worker testimony that the defendant’s product was used at the jobsite, purchase and invoice records, specifications showing the defendant’s equipment required asbestos insulation, union and employment records placing the plaintiff at a particular facility during a particular period, and industrial-hygiene evidence about how the product released fibers all contribute to the exposure showing. California courts have recognized that the question is whether, drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, a jury could find exposure, not whether the plaintiff can reconstruct every detail from memory.
At the same time, plaintiffs cannot rely on mere speculation. Decisions such as McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098 illustrate the floor: evidence that a defendant’s product was present somewhere in a large facility, without any link to the plaintiff’s actual work, may be too speculative to support an inference of exposure. The task for plaintiff’s counsel is to connect the product to the plaintiff’s specific activities, closing the gap between presence and exposure.
How Defendants Try to Meet Their Burden, and How Plaintiffs Respond
Experienced asbestos defendants know they cannot win on a bare assertion, so they build their motions around the plaintiff’s discovery record. They serve comprehensive interrogatories and depose the plaintiff early, seeking to lock in testimony that the plaintiff cannot identify their product. They then argue that the responses are factually devoid and that discovery is complete.
Plaintiff’s counsel defeats this by keeping the discovery record open and robust: identifying co-workers before they are lost, obtaining employment and product records, retaining experts who can connect the defendant’s product to the plaintiff’s work, and ensuring that discovery responses reflect the full circumstantial picture rather than a thin recitation. When the opposition demonstrates a genuine evidentiary route to exposure, Aguilar and Andrews require the court to deny the motion and let the jury decide.
Why This Procedure Protects Dying Plaintiffs
The allocation of the summary-judgment burden is not a dry technicality; it reflects a policy choice. California recognizes that asbestos diseases manifest decades after exposure, that memories fade and witnesses die, and that a rigid demand for direct product identification would unjustly bar legitimate claims. By requiring defendants to affirmatively establish that the plaintiff cannot prove exposure, even after full discovery, the law ensures that the factual question of exposure is usually decided by a jury weighing circumstantial evidence rather than by a judge on a cold motion record.
For a mesothelioma patient and their family, this means that the inability to name a product from memory is not the end of the case. With diligent investigation and a complete evidentiary record, the exposure question can almost always be preserved for trial. The defendant’s heavy burden under Aguilar, as applied in Andrews, is the procedural reason so many California asbestos cases survive summary judgment and proceed to resolution on the merits.
Trial Preference and the Pace of Asbestos Litigation
The summary-judgment fight unfolds against a backdrop of urgency unique to asbestos cases. California grants trial preference to plaintiffs whose health is failing, and Code of Civil Procedure section 36 entitles a party over seventy, or one with a substantial medical interest in an early trial, to a preferential trial date, often within 120 days. For a mesothelioma plaintiff with months to live, that preference is the mechanism that makes a meaningful trial possible, and it compresses the entire discovery and motion schedule, including summary judgment.
This acceleration cuts both ways on the Aguilar analysis. Defendants argue that an expedited schedule means the plaintiff has had its full, albeit compressed, opportunity for discovery, so factually devoid responses should shift the burden. Plaintiffs respond that the very compression counsels against treating early responses as exhaustive, because investigation is ongoing. California courts navigating this tension generally hold that the question is whether the plaintiff has had an adequate, not an unlimited, opportunity to respond, and that a defendant cannot leverage the plaintiff’s own medical urgency into a premature summary judgment. The trial-preference framework thus reinforces the protective thrust of Aguilar and Andrews.
Because the schedule moves quickly, plaintiff’s counsel must front-load the exposure investigation, taking the plaintiff’s deposition while the plaintiff can still testify, locating co-workers immediately, and retaining experts early. The evidentiary record that defeats summary judgment is the same record that will prove the case at a trial that may be only weeks away.
Expert Testimony and the Threshold-Exposure Requirement
Surviving summary judgment on product identification is only part of the causation picture. California requires that the plaintiff’s exposure to a defendant’s product be shown, through competent expert testimony, to have been a substantial factor in contributing to the risk of disease under Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953. Expert opinion connects the dose and duration of exposure to the medical outcome, and California courts apply the gatekeeping principles of Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 to ensure that expert opinions rest on a reasoned methodology rather than speculation.
The threshold-exposure concept from Lineaweaver v. Anchor Packing Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 requires a reasonable inference that the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant’s product, not merely that the product existed in the world. Plaintiffs meet this through industrial-hygiene and medical experts who explain how a given work activity released respirable fibers and how cumulative exposure contributes to mesothelioma, a disease that can result from relatively limited exposure. Defendants counter with their own experts and with McGonnell-style arguments that the connection is too attenuated. The summary-judgment and trial phases thus share the same evidentiary core: a well-developed exposure and causation record, built early, is what carries an asbestos case from a defense motion through to a verdict.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is summary judgment in an asbestos case?
It is a motion asking the court to decide the case without trial on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact. Asbestos defendants typically use it to argue the plaintiff cannot prove exposure to their specific product.
What did Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield hold?
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 established California’s modern summary-judgment standard. A moving defendant bears the burden of production to make a prima facie showing that an element cannot be established, and cannot win merely by pointing to the plaintiff’s supposed lack of evidence in the abstract.
How does Andrews v. Foster Wheeler apply this to asbestos cases?
Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96 held that a defendant relying on factually devoid discovery responses must show the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity for discovery and still cannot produce exposure evidence. Circumstantial evidence of exposure can defeat the motion.
Can circumstantial evidence prove asbestos exposure?
Yes. Co-worker testimony, product and employment records, equipment specifications, and industrial-hygiene evidence can establish a reasonable inference of exposure. The question is whether a jury could find exposure drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, not whether the plaintiff recalls every detail.
What is the causation standard in California asbestos cases?
Under Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, the plaintiff must show that exposure to the defendant’s asbestos-containing product was a substantial factor in contributing to the risk of developing the disease.
Is it enough that the defendant’s product was somewhere in the building?
No. Cases such as McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098 show that mere presence of a product in a large facility, without a link to the plaintiff’s actual work, may be too speculative. The product must be connected to the plaintiff’s specific activities.
Why is the defendant’s burden so important for dying plaintiffs?
Because asbestos diseases appear decades after exposure, direct product identification is often impossible. Placing a heavy burden on defendants ensures the exposure question is usually decided by a jury on circumstantial evidence rather than cut off on a motion.
What should a plaintiff do to survive summary judgment?
Preserve and develop the discovery record: locate co-workers early, obtain employment and product records, retain experts to connect the product to the plaintiff’s work, and ensure discovery responses reflect the full circumstantial picture of exposure.
The summary-judgment standard also shapes settlement dynamics, which resolve the majority of asbestos cases. A defendant that cannot realistically win its motion faces the full cost and risk of a preference trial before a sympathetic jury and a dying plaintiff, and it prices that risk into settlement. Conversely, a defendant that can show a genuine evidentiary gap, where the plaintiff truly cannot connect the product to the plaintiff’s work, holds real leverage. The quality of the plaintiff’s exposure record therefore drives not only whether the case survives the motion but what the case is worth.
For families navigating a mesothelioma diagnosis, the practical message is that early, thorough investigation is the single most valuable thing that can be done for the claim. Memories, documents, and witnesses are perishable, and the window for the plaintiff’s own testimony may be short. Counsel who move quickly to preserve that evidence put the plaintiff in the strongest position both to defeat the inevitable summary-judgment motions under Aguilar and Andrews and to secure a recovery that reflects the seriousness of the disease. Waiting, by contrast, risks losing the very proof that the burden-shifting framework is designed to protect.
Related Guides
If you or a family member has been diagnosed with mesothelioma or another asbestos disease in California, the asbestos attorneys at Trembach Law Firm can build the exposure record needed to defeat summary judgment and hold responsible defendants accountable. We locate co-workers and documentary evidence early, retain industrial-hygiene and medical experts who connect each defendant’s product to your specific work, and hold every defendant to the demanding burden that Aguilar and Andrews impose before a court may take your case from a jury. Because asbestos cases move on an accelerated preference schedule, the sooner that investigation begins, the stronger your position at both the summary-judgment and trial stages. There is no cost to speak with us, and we handle these cases on a contingency basis, so you pay nothing unless we recover for you. Call (213) 645-2246 for a confidential consultation about your asbestos claim.
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