MESOTHELIOMA | 2026-11-04

Sliding-Scale Settlement Agreements in California Asbestos Cases: Abbott Ford, Good Faith, and the Setoff That Follows

A settling defendant that guarantees the plaintiff a minimum recovery — and gets that money back if the plaintiff wins enough against the others — has entered a sliding-scale agreement. California allows these deals but regulates them closely, and Abbott Ford decides how the nonsettling defendants get credit.

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

Multi-defendant asbestos litigation often resolves one defendant at a time, and some of those settlements take an unusual form: the settling defendant guarantees the plaintiff a minimum recovery, but its actual payment slides down — sometimes to zero — as the plaintiff recovers from the remaining de

Asbestos cases are rarely between a single plaintiff and a single defendant. A mesothelioma plaintiff who was exposed over a working lifetime may sue dozens of manufacturers, suppliers, and premises owners, and those defendants settle on different timelines and terms. One of the more complex settlement structures is the sliding-scale recovery agreement, in which a settling defendant’s ultimate payment depends on what the plaintiff recovers from the nonsettling defendants. These agreements can be entirely legitimate tools for resolving litigation, but because they can distort the adversarial posture at trial, California regulates them. The governing framework comes from Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court and the statutes on good-faith settlement.

What a Sliding-Scale Agreement Is

In a typical sliding-scale (or "guaranteed verdict") agreement, the settling defendant guarantees the plaintiff a minimum total recovery. If the plaintiff’s recovery from the nonsettling defendants falls short of that guaranteed amount, the settling defendant pays the difference; if the plaintiff recovers enough from the others, the settling defendant pays less — potentially nothing. The settling defendant’s exposure thus slides inversely with the plaintiff’s success against the remaining parties. Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5 defines such an agreement as one in which the settling defendant’s liability is "dependent upon the amount of recovery which the plaintiff realizes against the nonsettling defendants."

The structural effect is to give the settling defendant an interest in a large verdict against its former co-defendants — the opposite of its interest before settling. A defendant that has guaranteed the plaintiff a floor wants the plaintiff to exceed that floor at trial, because every dollar the plaintiff recovers from the others reduces the settling defendant’s own payout. This realignment is what makes courts wary: a defendant that remains in the case (for appearances) while secretly rooting for the plaintiff can mislead the jury and prejudice the nonsettling defendants.

Disclosure: Code of Civil Procedure Section 877.5

California addresses the risk of concealment through mandatory disclosure. Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5 requires that the parties to a sliding-scale agreement promptly notify the court of the existence and the terms of the agreement, and, if the case goes to trial, that the jury be informed of the existence of the agreement (though not necessarily its precise dollar terms) when a settling defendant remains a party at trial. The statute is designed to strip away the deceptive appearance that a settling-but-still-present defendant is genuinely adverse to the plaintiff.

Disclosure serves two purposes. First, it lets the nonsettling defendants and the court evaluate whether the agreement is a good-faith settlement or a device to shift an unfair share of liability onto the parties left in the case. Second, it allows the jury to weigh the credibility of a settling defendant’s participation at trial with knowledge of its actual financial incentives. A failure to disclose a sliding-scale agreement as section 877.5 requires can be grounds for a new trial or other relief, because it deprives the other parties of information the statute guarantees them.

The Good-Faith Settlement Requirement

Like all settlements by one of several joint tortfeasors, a sliding-scale agreement must be found to have been made in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6. A good-faith determination has two consequences: it bars the nonsettling defendants from pursuing the settling defendant for equitable comparative contribution or indemnity, and it reduces the plaintiff’s claim against the nonsettling defendants by the amount of the settlement. The good-faith standard comes from Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, which lists factors including a rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid, and the absence of collusion aimed at injuring the nonsettling defendants.

Sliding-scale agreements complicate the good-faith analysis because the settling defendant’s actual payment is not fixed at the time of the settlement — it depends on the later verdict. The question the court must answer is whether the agreement, valued realistically, reflects a good-faith approximation of the settling defendant’s share of liability, or whether it is a collusive device to let a culpable defendant pay little while the nonsettling defendants absorb the loss. Valuing a contingent, sliding obligation for good-faith purposes was precisely the problem the Supreme Court took up in Abbott Ford.

Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court

In Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, the California Supreme Court addressed how to value a sliding-scale agreement for both the good-faith determination and the setoff credit owed to nonsettling defendants. The Court held that such agreements are permissible and can be made in good faith, but that the setoff credit cannot simply be the guaranteed amount or the (possibly zero) amount the settling defendant ultimately pays. Instead, the Court directed that the agreement be assigned a reasonable present value — the value of the guaranteed recovery discounted to reflect the contingency — and that this value serve as the measure of the settlement for purposes of the setoff and the good-faith analysis.

The Abbott Ford approach prevents two unfair outcomes. If the credit were the settling defendant’s actual (sliding) payment, a nonsettling defendant could end up with little or no credit even though the plaintiff received a substantial guaranteed recovery — overcharging the nonsettling defendants. If the credit were the full guaranteed amount, the nonsettling defendants might receive too large a credit for a contingent promise that cost the settling defendant little. By using a reasonable value of the consideration the plaintiff actually received, the Court sought to give the nonsettling defendants a fair setoff while still permitting the flexible settlement structure.

How the Setoff Works at Trial

When the case against the nonsettling asbestos defendants proceeds to verdict, the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the value attributed to the settlements. For a sliding-scale settlement, that value is the reasonable present value fixed under Abbott Ford, not the amount the settling defendant may eventually pay once the sliding mechanism operates. The setoff applies to the economic damages for which defendants are jointly liable; it interacts with Proposition 51 (Civil Code section 1431.2), which makes each defendant severally — not jointly — liable for noneconomic damages in proportion to fault.

In asbestos cases, where multiple settlements and bankruptcy-trust recoveries are common, the allocation of settlement credits can significantly affect the net recovery from the defendants who go to trial. Courts must sort out which settlements offset which categories of damages, how the sliding-scale value is allocated, and how the several-liability rule for noneconomic damages limits the exposure of each remaining defendant. These computations are technical, and the amounts at stake are often large. For a broader overview of asbestos and mesothelioma claims, see our mesothelioma and asbestos practice.

Why This Matters in Mesothelioma Litigation

Sliding-scale agreements appear in asbestos litigation because the cases are high-value, the defendants are numerous, and the parties have strong incentives to manage risk through creative settlements. A manufacturer facing a mesothelioma claim may prefer a capped, contingent exposure to the uncertainty of a jury verdict, and a guaranteed-recovery structure gives the plaintiff certainty while letting the settling defendant limit its downside. But because these agreements can tilt the trial dynamics, every party — plaintiff, settling defendant, and nonsettling defendant — has a stake in how they are disclosed, valued, and credited.

For a plaintiff, a sliding-scale settlement can secure a floor of recovery while preserving upside against the remaining defendants; the plaintiff must ensure the agreement is disclosed and survives good-faith review so the settlement holds. For a nonsettling defendant, vigilance is essential: it must demand disclosure under section 877.5, contest an inadequate Abbott Ford valuation that would short its setoff, and police for collusion. For a settling defendant, the agreement must be structured and valued to withstand a good-faith challenge, or it risks losing the contribution bar that is the whole point of settling.

Practical Cautions

Three cautions recur. First, disclose early and fully: section 877.5 is not a formality, and nondisclosure can unravel a settlement or support a new trial. Second, value the agreement realistically: an Abbott Ford valuation that ignores the real present value of the guaranteed recovery invites a good-faith challenge and a dispute over setoff credit. Third, watch the trial posture: when a settling defendant remains in the case under a sliding-scale agreement, its examination of witnesses and argument to the jury must be understood in light of its realigned incentives, and the jury is entitled to know the agreement exists.

Because the stakes in mesothelioma cases are high and the settlement structures intricate, parties on all sides benefit from counsel experienced in multi-defendant asbestos litigation. The interplay of sections 877, 877.5, and 877.6, the Tech-Bilt good-faith factors, the Abbott Ford valuation rule, and Proposition 51’s several-liability regime determines who ultimately pays what — and getting those rules right can move a great deal of money.

Collusion and the Limits of Good Faith

The Tech-Bilt good-faith inquiry has a floor: a settlement that is grossly disproportionate to the settling defendant’s fair share of liability, or that is shaped by collusion aimed at injuring the nonsettling defendants, is not in good faith and will not bar contribution. Sliding-scale agreements draw heightened scrutiny on this point because their structure can invite the very collusion the good-faith rule forbids — a settling defendant and a plaintiff aligning their interests against the remaining defendants. California courts therefore examine not just the nominal terms but the economic reality of the deal.

The disclosure mandate of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5 is the principal safeguard. By requiring that the agreement and its terms be revealed to the court and that the jury be told a settling-but-present defendant has such an agreement, the statute strips away concealment and lets the fact-finder discount a settling defendant’s trial conduct accordingly. A nonsettling asbestos defendant who suspects a sliding-scale arrangement should move promptly to compel disclosure and, if the valuation appears inadequate, oppose the good-faith motion with evidence of the settling defendant’s true proportionate liability. The remedy for a nondisclosed or collusive agreement can include denial of the good-faith determination, preservation of contribution rights, and, in egregious cases, a new trial — consequences serious enough that careful compliance is in every party’s interest.

Bankruptcy-Trust Recoveries and Multiple Setoffs

Modern asbestos litigation layers sliding-scale and conventional settlements on top of recoveries from bankruptcy trusts established under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) by insolvent former manufacturers. A mesothelioma plaintiff may hold claims against a dozen trusts while simultaneously litigating against solvent defendants in the tort system. The interaction of trust recoveries with trial setoffs is a recurring battleground: nonsettling defendants argue that trust payments and settlement credits should reduce the plaintiff’s recovery, while plaintiffs seek to preserve the distinction between the trust and tort systems.

California courts resolve these disputes through the setoff rules of Code of Civil Procedure section 877 and the several-liability regime of Civil Code section 1431.2 (Proposition 51). Economic damages for which defendants are jointly liable are reduced by qualifying settlement credits — including the Abbott Ford value of any sliding-scale agreement — while each defendant remains severally liable for its own share of noneconomic damages. The sequencing and allocation of these multiple credits can change the net verdict substantially, and disputes over how trust recoveries fit into the setoff framework are among the most technical issues in asbestos trials. Because the computations compound across many settling parties and trusts, precise record-keeping and early motion practice on allocation are essential to protecting each party’s position.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a sliding-scale settlement agreement?

It is a settlement in which the settling defendant guarantees the plaintiff a minimum recovery, but the settling defendant’s actual payment decreases as the plaintiff recovers from the nonsettling defendants — sometimes to zero. Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5 defines it as an agreement where the settlor’s liability depends on the plaintiff’s recovery against the others.

Are sliding-scale agreements legal in California?

Yes. In Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, the California Supreme Court held that sliding-scale agreements are permissible and can be made in good faith, subject to disclosure and to a fair valuation for setoff purposes.

What does Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5 require?

It requires the parties to promptly notify the court of the existence and terms of a sliding-scale agreement, and, when a settling defendant remains a party at trial, to inform the jury that the agreement exists, so the jury can assess that defendant’s true incentives.

Why are these agreements sometimes called "Mary Carter" agreements?

"Mary Carter" is a historical label, drawn from an out-of-state case, for agreements in which a settling defendant stays in the case with a financial interest in the plaintiff’s success against the remaining defendants. California’s sliding-scale agreements share that realigned-incentive feature.

How is the setoff credit calculated under Abbott Ford?

The nonsettling defendants receive a credit based on the reasonable present value of the guaranteed recovery — the contingent promise discounted to reflect its real value — rather than the full guaranteed amount or the possibly zero amount the settling defendant ultimately pays.

What is the good-faith settlement requirement?

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 and Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, a settlement by one joint tortfeasor must be made in good faith to bar contribution claims and to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery against the others. The court weighs the settlor’s proportionate liability and the absence of collusion.

How does Proposition 51 affect the setoff?

Proposition 51 (Civil Code section 1431.2) makes each defendant severally liable for noneconomic damages in proportion to fault. Settlement setoffs apply to the jointly liable economic damages, so the interplay between setoff and several liability must be worked out carefully in multi-defendant asbestos cases.

Why do these agreements appear so often in asbestos cases?

Asbestos cases are high-value and involve many defendants settling on different terms. Sliding-scale agreements let a defendant cap and make contingent its exposure while giving the plaintiff a guaranteed floor, which makes them an attractive risk-management tool in complex mesothelioma litigation.

Speak With a California Asbestos Attorney

Sliding-scale settlements can protect a mesothelioma plaintiff’s recovery or unfairly shift loss onto nonsettling defendants, depending on how they are disclosed and valued. The interplay of the good-faith factors, the disclosure mandate, the Abbott Ford valuation rule, bankruptcy-trust recoveries, and Proposition 51’s several-liability regime can move a great deal of money, and a mistake in any one of them can shift the loss to the wrong party. If you are involved in multi-defendant asbestos litigation and need to evaluate a settlement structure or a setoff dispute, Trembach Law Firm can help. Call (213) 645-2246 to discuss your case with a California asbestos and mesothelioma attorney.

This article is for general informational purposes and is not legal advice. Settlement structures and setoff computations are fact-specific and depend on the particular agreements and verdict. Consult a qualified attorney about your circumstances.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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