SECURITIES | 2026-11-12

Section 15 Controlling Person Liability Under the Securities Act of 1933: How Directors, Officers, and Parent Companies Become Jointly Liable for a Defective California Offering

How 15 U.S.C. § 77o extends Section 11 and Section 12 liability to those who control the issuer, how it differs from Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and how the good-faith defense and California Corporations Code § 25504 fit together

By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published

A misstatement in a registration statement or prospectus can expose far more than the issuing company. Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 reaches up the corporate chain, making directors, officers, controlling shareholders, and parent companies jointly and severally liable for the primary...

What Section 15 Does: Liability That Climbs the Corporate Ladder

The Securities Act of 1933 imposes primary liability for defective offerings through two provisions. Section 11 (15 U.S.C. § 77k) creates liability for material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement. Section 12 (15 U.S.C. § 77l) creates liability for selling securities by means of a false prospectus or oral communication, and for selling unregistered securities. Neither provision, standing alone, reaches every person who controls the issuer.

Section 15 of the Securities Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77o, closes that gap. It provides that "every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise … controls any person liable under sections 77k or 77l of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person." In plain terms: if the issuer is liable under Section 11 or Section 12, anyone who controls the issuer is liable too, for the same amount — unless they establish the good-faith defense.

The Predicate Requirement: No Primary Violation, No Section 15 Liability

Section 15 is a secondary-liability statute. It cannot stand on its own. A plaintiff must first establish a primary violation by the controlled person under Section 11 or Section 12. This matters because Section 11 is, for the issuer, close to a strict-liability provision: a plaintiff who purchased registered securities need not prove scienter, reliance (in most cases), or even that the defendant acted negligently. Once that primary violation is established against the issuer, the controlling person is pulled in automatically, subject only to the statutory defense. The strength of a Section 15 claim therefore rises and falls with the strength of the underlying Section 11 or Section 12 claim.

What "Control" Means

The operative word is "control," and the SEC defines it in 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." Control is a fact-intensive inquiry. Courts look at stock ownership, board representation, officer positions, and the practical ability to influence corporate conduct. A majority shareholder plainly controls; so does a parent company over a subsidiary issuer. But control can also be found in a venture investor with a board seat and contractual veto rights, or in officers who manage day-to-day operations. The provision’s breadth is deliberate — Congress wanted the people who actually direct an enterprise to stand behind its offering documents.

The Good-Faith Defense: The Controlling Person’s Escape Hatch

Section 15 contains its own affirmative defense. A controlling person is not liable if it "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." This is a good-faith, no-knowledge standard, and critically, the burden of proving it rests on the defendant. A director who established and relied on reasonable internal controls, who exercised genuine oversight of the offering process, and who had no reason to suspect the misstatement is far better positioned than one who rubber-stamped a prospectus. The defense rewards process: documented diligence, reliance on qualified experts and counsel, and active board engagement are what carry it.

Section 15 Versus Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act

Practitioners must not conflate Section 15 with Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)), its sibling provision. Both impose controlling person liability, but they attach to different primary violations. Section 15 controls Section 11 and Section 12 liability — defects in registered offerings and prospectuses. Section 20(a) controls Exchange Act violations, most prominently Rule 10b-5 fraud in the secondary trading markets. The two also differ in their defenses: Section 15 excuses a control person who had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the underlying facts, while Section 20(a) excuses one who acted in good faith and did not induce the violation, and courts have divided over whether Section 20(a) requires a plaintiff to plead "culpable participation." Because an offering gone wrong can generate both registration-statement claims and fraud claims, plaintiffs may plead Section 15 and Section 20(a) in the alternative, and defendants must analyze each independently.

Joint and Several Liability: The Full Measure of Exposure

Section 15 imposes liability "to the same extent as such controlled person." A controlling person held liable is on the hook for the entire measure of damages recoverable against the issuer, not some reduced or apportioned share. For an individual director or a thinly capitalized parent, that is a daunting prospect: the issuer’s liability becomes the control person’s liability in full. This is why the good-faith defense, rather than damages arguments, is usually the center of gravity in a Section 15 defense, and why control persons insist on robust directors-and-officers insurance before an offering proceeds.

The California Parallel: Corporations Code § 25504

California’s blue-sky law contains a controlling person provision that tracks the federal model. Corporations Code § 25504 makes every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under Section 25501 or Section 25503 jointly and severally liable with the controlled person, along with principal executive officers, directors, and certain others who materially aid the violation. Like Section 15, it provides a defense for a person who "had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist." Because California plaintiffs may plead Section 25504 alongside the federal claim, control persons in California offerings face a two-front analysis, and the good-faith record they build must satisfy both standards.

Who Is Exposed: Practical Scenarios for California Companies

Section 15 exposure is not abstract. A startup founder who controls the company through supervoting shares is a control person. A venture fund with a board designee and protective provisions may be found to control the issuer. A parent company that spins out a subsidiary in a registered offering controls that subsidiary. Even senior officers who direct the offering process can qualify. Each of these persons should assume that if the registration statement or prospectus contains a material misstatement, they will be named — and that their defense will depend on the diligence record they created before the offering, not on arguments invented afterward.

Building the Good-Faith Record Before the Offering

Because the good-faith defense is the heart of Section 15 and Section 25504 protection, control persons should build the record prospectively. That means documenting board review of the offering materials, engaging qualified underwriters’ counsel and auditors and reasonably relying on their work, maintaining disclosure controls, and recording the questions directors asked and the answers they received. A control person who can show a genuine, documented oversight process is positioned to assert the defense; one who cannot is left to the mercy of a strict-liability primary claim. The time to create that record is before the securities are sold, not after a complaint arrives.

The "Culpable Participation" Debate and Its Practical Effect

One of the most litigated questions in controlling person law is whether a plaintiff must plead and prove that the control person was a "culpable participant" in the primary violation, or whether proof of control alone shifts the burden to the defendant to establish good faith. For Section 15 of the Securities Act, the text frames the question differently: the statute makes a controlling person liable unless it "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts" underlying the violation, framing good faith as an affirmative defense the defendant must prove. Many courts read that structure to mean a plaintiff who establishes a primary Section 11 or Section 12 violation and the defendant’s control has made out a prima facie case, with the burden then falling on the control person to show it lacked knowledge and reason to know; however, courts have not uniformly agreed, and some have required culpable participation for Section 15 claims as well.

The debate is most prominent under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, where federal circuits have split over whether culpable participation is an element of the plaintiff’s case. The practical consequence for a California company is that a complaint arising from a troubled offering often pleads both provisions, and the control person’s defense strategy differs between them: under Section 15, the emphasis is on building and proving the good-faith record; under Section 20(a), it may also include contesting whether the plaintiff has adequately alleged the control person’s participation. Counsel who treat the two provisions as interchangeable miss these distinctions to their client’s detriment.

Section 15 in Private Litigation and Regulatory Context

Section 15 appears most often in private securities class actions following a disappointing registered offering — typically an initial public offering whose stock later declines amid revelations that the registration statement contained a material misstatement. Plaintiffs name the issuer under Section 11, the signing directors and officers as primary defendants, and the controlling persons under Section 15. The control-person claim broadens the pool of solvent defendants and increases settlement pressure, which is precisely why plaintiffs plead it. For venture investors and parent companies, that dynamic means a control-person claim can arise even where they had no hand in drafting the offering documents, placing a premium on the good-faith defense and on robust directors-and-officers insurance negotiated before the offering.

The provision also interacts with the broader liability framework of the Securities Act. Because Section 11 affords its own statutory due-diligence defenses to directors and experts, and because Section 12(a)(2) has its own reasonable-care defense for sellers, a control person’s exposure is layered on top of whatever defenses the primary defendants assert. A sophisticated defense coordinates these: if the primary defendants defeat liability, the Section 15 claim collapses for want of a predicate, so control persons have every incentive to support a vigorous defense of the underlying Section 11 and Section 12 claims rather than treating their secondary liability as a separate problem.

Practical Compliance Steps for Boards and Investors

Because controlling person liability turns on the good-faith defense, the most valuable work happens long before any lawsuit. Boards preparing for a registered offering should insist on a genuine due-diligence process: a drafting timeline that allows real review of the registration statement, dedicated sessions in which directors question management and the underwriters about the disclosures, and documented reliance on the auditors’ comfort letters and counsel’s opinions. Directors should ensure the company maintains disclosure controls and procedures adequate to surface material information, and should record the substance of their review — the questions asked and the answers received — in minutes that demonstrate active oversight rather than passive approval.

Investors who hold board seats face a particular tension. The very rights that make a venture fund attractive — board representation, protective provisions, information rights — are the rights that can establish "control." Such investors cannot avoid the control characterization by staying silent; silence undermines the good-faith defense, which depends on showing engaged, reasonable oversight. The better course is to participate meaningfully in the diligence process and to document that participation, so that if a control-person claim is later asserted, the investor can point to a real record of reasonable care. Parent companies issuing securities of a subsidiary should apply the same discipline to the subsidiary’s offering that they would to their own.

Finally, control persons should treat directors-and-officers insurance as part of the offering preparation, not an afterthought. Coverage should be confirmed to extend to Securities Act claims, including control-person liability, and the limits should reflect the offering’s size and risk. Insurance does not replace the good-faith defense, but it can fund the defense and help backstop a settlement, and negotiating it after a complaint arrives is too late. Together, a documented diligence record and appropriate coverage form the practical core of control-person risk management.

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Frequently Asked Questions

Does Section 15 create liability on its own?

No. Section 15 is a secondary-liability provision. A plaintiff must first establish a primary violation by the controlled person under Section 11 or Section 12 of the Securities Act. If there is no underlying violation, there is no Section 15 liability.

Who counts as a "controlling person"?

Under 17 C.F.R. § 230.405, control is the power, direct or indirect, to direct the management and policies of a person. That can include majority shareholders, parent companies, directors, senior officers, and sometimes venture investors with board seats and veto rights. It is a fact-intensive inquiry.

How can a director or parent company avoid Section 15 liability?

By carrying the statutory good-faith defense: proving they had no knowledge of, and no reasonable ground to believe in, the facts underlying the primary violation. A documented diligence and oversight process is what sustains that defense, and the burden of proof is on the control person.

How is Section 15 different from Section 20(a)?

Section 15 of the Securities Act controls Section 11 and Section 12 liability for registered offerings and prospectuses. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act controls Exchange Act violations such as Rule 10b-5 fraud. They attach to different primary violations and can be pleaded together.

Is Section 15 liability apportioned or full?

It is full. The statute imposes liability "to the same extent as such controlled person," meaning joint and several liability for the entire measure of damages recoverable against the controlled person, not a reduced share.

Does California have its own controlling person statute?

Yes. Corporations Code § 25504 imposes controlling person liability under California blue-sky law, with a good-faith defense that parallels Section 15. Plaintiffs may plead both, so control persons can face a two-front analysis.

Does Section 11’s lack of a scienter requirement make Section 15 easier to prove?

Indirectly, yes. Because Section 11 does not require a plaintiff to prove the issuer’s scienter, the predicate violation is comparatively easy to establish, which in turn exposes control persons who cannot carry the good-faith defense.

Should control persons rely on D&O insurance alone?

Insurance is important but not a substitute for the good-faith defense. Directors-and-officers coverage can fund a defense and indemnify a settlement, but the stronger protection is a documented oversight process that can help defeat liability in the first place.

Speak With a California Securities Attorney

If you are a director, officer, controlling shareholder, parent company, or investor involved in a California securities offering, Trembach Law Firm can assess your controlling person exposure under Section 15 of the Securities Act and Corporations Code § 25504, structure the offering and board process to preserve the good-faith defense, and defend you if litigation follows. For a consultation, call (818) 514-7680. We represent issuers, control persons, and investors in registered and exempt offerings and in securities litigation. Because controlling person exposure is decided largely by the diligence record created before an offering, the most important time to involve counsel is during the preparation of the registration statement and the structuring of the board’s review process — not after a complaint is filed. We work with directors, officers, parent companies, and investors to build the good-faith record that supports a defense to a Section 15 or Corporations Code § 25504 claim and to coordinate that record with the primary defenses available to the issuer under Sections 11 and 12.

This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.

Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.

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