SECURITIES | 2026-11-13
Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Rescinding Contracts Made in Violation of the Securities Laws in California
How 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) lets an innocent party void a contract whose making or performance violated the Exchange Act, the Berckeley elements, the privity requirement, and the limitation periods
By Anatolii Trembach, Esq. (California State Bar No. 349304; LL.M., USC Gould School of Law; admitted to the U.S. Court of International Trade), Trembach Law Firm, APC · Published
Most securities litigation seeks damages. Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act offers something different and sometimes far more powerful: the right to undo the contract itself. When a securities contract is made in violation of the Exchange Act, or cannot be performed without violating it,...
What Section 29(b) Provides
Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b), states that every contract made in violation of any provision of the Exchange Act or its rules, and every contract whose performance involves such a violation, "shall be void" as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of the Act, made or engaged in the performance of the contract, and as regards the rights of any non-party who acquired rights under it with actual knowledge of the facts that made its making or performance unlawful. In plain terms, when a securities-related contract is tainted by an Exchange Act violation at its making or in its performance, the law refuses to let the violator enforce it against the innocent party, and the courts have recognized an implied right for that party to seek rescission — unwinding the transaction and restoring the parties to the positions they held before it.
This is a remedy of a different character than a damages claim. Rescission does not ask a court to measure a loss; it asks the court to cancel the bargain. For a counterparty locked into an agreement that should never have been enforceable, that can be the most complete relief available.
"Void" Really Means Voidable
Although the statute says such contracts "shall be void," the courts have long read that language to mean voidable at the election of the innocent party, not automatically void. The Ninth Circuit explained in Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), that although Section 29(b) declares such contracts void as regards the rights of the violator, it does not make them void as regards the rights of the innocent party, who may elect to keep the investment or sue to rescind — and who, because the contract is voidable, remains subject to ordinary defenses such as waiver and estoppel. The Supreme Court endorsed the same reading in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), stating that Section 29(b) bars the guilty party from enforcing the contract against an unwilling innocent party but does not make the contract a nullity, and describing such contracts as merely voidable at the option of the innocent party. The violator cannot use its own violation as a sword. This interpretation preserves the protective purpose of the statute: it is a shield for the party the securities laws were meant to protect, not an escape hatch for the party who broke them. Reading the statute otherwise would reward the wrongdoer by letting it walk away from a bargain it no longer liked, which would run contrary to the statute’s protective purpose.
The Berckeley Elements
The most frequently cited framework for a Section 29(b) claim comes from Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2006), which adopted a test first articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Regional Properties (discussed below). To rescind under Section 29(b), the party seeking rescission generally must establish three elements: first, that the contract involved a prohibited transaction — that is, the making or performance of the contract violated the Exchange Act or a rule thereunder; second, that the plaintiff is in contractual privity with the defendant; and third, that the plaintiff is in the class of persons the securities laws were designed to protect. Each element matters. The privity requirement limits rescission to parties to the tainted contract, not strangers to it. The protected-class requirement ties the remedy back to the statute’s purpose.
The Critical Distinction: Contracts Void in Their Making or Performance
Berckeley and the cases following it draw a line that decides most Section 29(b) disputes. The statute reaches two categories of contracts: those whose making violated the Exchange Act, and those whose performance involved a violation. It does not reach every contract that is merely connected to, or entered into against the backdrop of, a securities violation. In the Third Circuit’s formulation, the party seeking rescission must show a direct relationship between the violation and the contract — the violation must be "inseparable from the performance of the contract" — and "unlawful transactions made pursuant to lawful contracts" fall outside Section 29(b). Applying that rule, Berckeley held that the lender’s later resales of stock were tangential to the parties’ basic obligations, because the agreement could be performed without violating the securities laws. The Second Circuit took a similar approach in Xeriant, Inc. v. Auctus Fund, LLC, No. 24-682 (2d Cir. June 25, 2025), declining to rescind a financing agreement that did not itself require the lender to engage in unregistered dealer activity. The Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision in Regional Properties was somewhat broader, allowing rescission of contracts "perfectly lawful on their face" whose actual performance violated the Act. This distinction is where many rescission claims succeed or fail, and the governing circuit’s precedent matters: the party seeking rescission must tie the violation to the contract, not merely to the other side’s broader conduct.
A Classic Application: Unregistered Broker-Dealers
One of the clearest applications of Section 29(b) involves contracts with unregistered broker-dealers. Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act generally makes it unlawful for a broker or dealer to use the mails or interstate commerce to effect, or to induce or attempt to induce, securities transactions unless registered. When a person acts as an unregistered broker-dealer under a contract — for example, a finder’s or placement agreement whose performance involves broker-dealer functions — the counterparty may be able to rescind that contract under Section 29(b). The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982), is a leading example. Real estate developers had engaged an unregistered broker to structure and sell limited partnership interests; the court held that the developers could rescind because the agreements’ performance involved the Section 15(a) violation, while recognizing that equitable defenses such as laches may be raised. The relief was only partial: the broker lost any further rights under the agreements and the escrowed portion of its fee, but was allowed to keep fees already paid for services it had performed. For California companies that engage finders or placement agents, this is a live risk worth discussing with counsel experienced in securities compliance: paying success fees to an unregistered intermediary may render the fee agreement voidable.
The Limitation Period
Section 29(b) contains an express limitations proviso, but it is narrower than it first appears. By its terms, it applies to an action by a person to or for whom a broker or dealer sold (or from or for whom it purchased) a security in violation of a rule prescribed under Section 15(c)(1) or (2) of the Exchange Act; such an action must be brought within one year after the discovery that the sale or purchase involves the violation and within three years after the violation. The same proviso also states that no contract is void under Section 29(b) because of a violation of a rule prescribed under Section 15(c)(3). For Section 29(b) claims based on other violations — such as an unregistered broker’s Section 15(a) violation — the statute sets no express period, and the applicable period is unsettled. Candidates include the one-year/three-year structure the Supreme Court adopted for implied Rule 10b-5 claims in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), or, for claims involving fraud, deceit, or manipulation, the two-years-from-discovery/five-years-from-violation period of 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b); equitable defenses such as laches may also apply. A party contemplating rescission should not sit on the claim: depending on which period governs, the remedy can be extinguished before a dispute fully matures. Because rescission is often considered only after a relationship sours — sometimes years into a contract — the limitation period is frequently the first and most dangerous obstacle, and it must be analyzed at the outset.
What Rescission Restores
The object of rescission is to return the parties to the status quo ante — the positions they occupied before the tainted contract. In practice, that typically means the innocent party returns what it received and recovers what it paid, with adjustments to account for benefits conferred. Rescission is an equitable remedy, and courts shape the restoration to avoid unjust enrichment on either side. For a plaintiff, this can mean recovering money paid under an unlawful agreement; for a defendant resisting rescission, it can mean arguing that the plaintiff cannot or will not restore what it received, or that equitable considerations weigh against unwinding the deal.
Section 29(b) Compared to a Damages Claim
Choosing between a Section 29(b) rescission theory and a conventional damages claim is a strategic decision. Rescission avoids the difficult task of proving and measuring loss and can deliver complete relief where a contract is fundamentally tainted. But it carries its own burdens: the plaintiff must fit the strict elements, establish privity, show the violation inheres in the contract, and act within the applicable limitation period. In some disputes, a plaintiff will plead rescission alongside damages claims under other provisions, preserving flexibility, and will develop the factual record to support whichever theory the evidence ultimately favors as discovery proceeds. Pleading in the alternative is often prudent precisely because whether a violation inheres in the contract, as opposed to being collateral to it, is a fact-intensive question that may not be fully resolved until the record is developed. In others, rescission is the only meaningful remedy — for instance, where the harm is being locked into an unlawful ongoing obligation rather than a quantifiable past loss. Identifying which posture fits the facts is the heart of the analysis.
Defending Against a Section 29(b) Claim
From the defense side, Section 29(b) claims are resisted on the same elements that define them. The defendant argues that the contract is lawful on its face and could be performed without any violation, so the violation does not inhere in the contract; that the plaintiff lacks privity or is not within the protected class; that the claim is time-barred under the applicable limitation period or barred by equitable defenses such as laches; or that the plaintiff cannot restore the status quo. Because the statute is narrow by design, a defendant who can show the alleged violation is collateral to the contract — rather than embedded in its making or performance — often defeats rescission even where a separate securities violation may have occurred.
Section 29(b) Versus Section 29(a): Two Different Rules
Section 29 of the Exchange Act contains two distinct provisions that are easy to confuse. Section 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a), voids any condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person to waive compliance with the Exchange Act — it polices anticipatory waivers of the statute’s protections, such as a clause purporting to release future securities-law claims. Section 29(b), by contrast, addresses the enforceability of contracts whose making or performance actually violated the Act, and it supplies the rescission remedy discussed here. The two work together: Section 29(a) prevents parties from contracting out of the securities laws in advance, while Section 29(b) refuses enforcement to contracts that themselves embody a violation.
For a California litigant, the distinction shapes the pleading. A claim that a release or waiver clause is unenforceable sounds in Section 29(a); a claim to unwind a contract because its making or performance broke the Exchange Act sounds in Section 29(b). Confusing the two can lead to pleading the wrong theory and missing the specific elements each requires. A careful complaint identifies which subsection applies to which contractual provision, because the remedies and the analysis diverge.
Collateral Contracts, Severability, and the Limits of Rescission
A frequent battleground in Section 29(b) litigation is how far the voidability reaches within a complex transaction. Courts distinguish the contract whose making or performance violated the Act from collateral agreements that are merely connected to it. A securities transaction may involve a web of agreements — a purchase agreement, a registration-rights agreement, a note, warrants — and not all of them are necessarily tainted by a violation that inheres in one. Section 29(b) voids the specific contract that embodies the violation, not every agreement in the surrounding deal, unless those agreements are themselves unlawful in their making or performance.
Severability doctrine can further complicate the picture. Where a single agreement contains both lawful and unlawful obligations, a court may consider whether the unlawful portion can be severed, leaving the remainder enforceable, or whether the violation so permeates the contract that the whole must fall. These questions turn on the structure of the transaction and the nature of the violation, and they are why Section 29(b) disputes often become detailed examinations of exactly which promise required a violation to perform. A plaintiff seeking rescission must tie the remedy to the specific contract and obligation the violation infected; a defendant resists by confining the violation to a severable or collateral piece that does not void the agreement the plaintiff wants undone.
Scenarios Where Rescission Is the Right Tool
Section 29(b) rescission is not a theory for every securities dispute, but there are recurring situations where it is the most effective remedy. One is the unregistered-intermediary case: a company that paid transaction-based compensation to a finder or placement agent who was required to register as a broker-dealer and did not may be able to use Section 29(b) to avoid unpaid fees and further obligations under the agreement, where the agreement’s performance involved the Section 15(a) violation; whether fees already paid can be recovered is a separate equitable question, and in Regional Properties the broker was allowed to keep fees already paid for services it had performed. Another is the margin or lending context, where a contract’s performance would require conduct the Exchange Act prohibits; in Grove v. First National Bank of Herminie, 489 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1974), as Berckeley later described it, Section 29(b) barred a bank from recovering a loan deficiency because the loans were made in violation of the Regulation U margin requirements. A third arises in convertible-security financing, where issuers have argued that a lender acted as an unregistered dealer. Courts have scrutinized these claims closely: Berckeley, itself a convertible-debenture case, rejected rescission premised on the lender’s later resales (while reinstating a separate rescission claim based on alleged misrepresentations that induced the agreement), and the Second Circuit in Xeriant declined rescission where the agreement did not itself require dealer activity.
In each scenario, the common thread is that the violation is not merely background conduct — it is woven into the contract’s making or performance, so that enforcing the contract would require or ratify the violation. Where that is true, rescission may offer relief a damages claim cannot: it can release the innocent party from an ongoing unlawful obligation and, subject to equitable limits, restore what was paid. Where it is not true — where the contract could be performed lawfully and the violation is separate — Section 29(b) is the wrong tool, and the party must look to damages remedies under other provisions. Identifying which category a dispute falls into, early and accurately, is the key judgment a litigant must make before committing to a rescission strategy.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What does Section 29(b) do?
Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b), makes contracts whose making or performance violates the Exchange Act unenforceable by the violator, and courts read it as letting the innocent party seek to rescind — unwind the contract and be restored to its pre-contract position — rather than only seek damages.
Does "void" mean the contract is automatically a nullity?
No. Courts read "void" to mean voidable at the election of the innocent party. The Supreme Court described such contracts as merely voidable at the option of the innocent party in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and the Ninth Circuit in Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), held that the statute does not make the contract void as to the innocent party, who may keep the investment or sue to rescind, subject to defenses such as waiver and estoppel.
What must a plaintiff prove?
Under Berckeley Investment Group v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2006), which adopted the Regional Properties test, the party seeking rescission must show the contract involved a prohibited transaction (a violation in its making or performance), that the plaintiff is in contractual privity with the defendant, and that the plaintiff is within the class the securities laws protect.
Does any securities violation make a contract voidable?
No. The violation must be tied to the contract — to how it was made or how it was performed. The Third and Second Circuits hold that unlawful transactions made pursuant to a lawful contract that could be performed lawfully do not support rescission, while the Fifth Circuit in Regional Properties allowed rescission of a facially lawful contract whose actual performance violated the Act. A separate, collateral violation is not enough.
How does this apply to unregistered brokers?
Contracts whose performance involves acting as an unregistered broker-dealer in violation of Section 15(a) may be rescinded. Regional Properties v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982), is a leading example, although the relief there was partial and the broker kept fees already paid for services performed. California companies paying finders or placement agents should heed this risk.
Is there a deadline to sue?
It depends on the violation. Section 29(b)’s express proviso requires an action by a customer against a broker or dealer based on a violation of rules under Section 15(c)(1) or (2) to be brought within one year after discovery of the violation and within three years after the violation. For other Section 29(b) claims the statute sets no express period, the applicable period is unsettled, and equitable defenses such as laches may apply, so timing must be assessed early.
What do I recover if I win?
Rescission aims to restore the status quo ante: generally, the innocent party returns what it received and may recover what it paid, with equitable adjustments to prevent unjust enrichment. Courts may order only partial relief where full restoration is impossible or inequitable; it is an equitable remedy shaped to avoid a windfall to either side.
Should I plead rescission or damages?
It depends on the facts. Rescission avoids proving a measured loss and can give complete relief where a contract is fundamentally tainted, but it requires fitting strict elements and acting within the applicable limitation period. Plaintiffs sometimes plead both to preserve flexibility.
Speak With a California Securities Attorney
If you are locked into a securities contract that may have been made or performed in violation of the Exchange Act — or you are defending a rescission demand — Trembach Law Firm can evaluate whether Section 29(b) applies, evaluate the Berckeley elements from either side, and help you act within the applicable limitation period. For a consultation, call (818) 514-7680. We represent investors, issuers, and counterparties in securities litigation and rescission disputes. Because a Section 29(b) claim turns on fitting strict elements — a violation that inheres in the contract’s making or performance, privity, protected-class standing, and the applicable limitation period — the time to analyze whether rescission is available is early, while the limitation clock is running and the documentary record of how the contract was formed and performed can still be preserved and marshaled to support or contest the claim.
This article is provided for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and no particular outcome is guaranteed.
Contact Trembach Law Firm at (818) 514-7680 for a confidential consultation.
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